

TEXTS FOR READING.

ТЕКСТЫ ДЛЯ ЧТЕНИЯ

Text for reading to unit I.

Текст для чтения к модулю I

From Prashad, V. *Everybody Was Kung Fu Fighting: Afro-Asian Connections and the Myth of Cultural Purity*. – Beacon Press, 2002.

The Forethought: Raw Skin

....I have chosen to discuss the peoples who claim the heritage of the continents of Asia and Africa, not only because they are important to me, but because they have long been pitted against each other as the model versus the undesirable. I hope by looking at how these two cultural worlds are imbricated in complex and varied ways through five centuries and around the globe that I can help us rethink race, culture, and the organization of our society. This book is, if you will, a search for a new skin. We begin our journey in the Indian Ocean region, with the destruction of the economic and cultural traffic that defined the premodern world. The birth of Atlantic racism superseded and (through fascism) transformed earlier xenophobic ideas into the cruelty of biological hierarchy. White supremacy emerged in the throes of capitalism's planetary birth to justify the expropriation of people off their lands and the exploitation of people for their labor. Of course, the discussion of the birth of racism begs the question of its demise: What is a useful antiracist ideological framework? The conservative theory of the color blind and the racialist theory of the indigenous, in their own way, smuggle in biological ideas of race to denigrate the creativity of diverse humans. The best liberal response to the color blind and to racialism comes from those who refuse to believe in the biological weight given to skin. This position, the liberalism of the skin, suggests that there are different skins, and we must learn to respect and tolerate one another. Liberalism of the skin, which we generically know as multiculturalism, refuses to accept that biology is destiny, but

it smuggles in culture to do much the same thing. Culture becomes the means for social and historical difference, how we differentiate ourselves, and adopt the habits of the past to create and delimit social groups. The familiar dichotomy between nature–nurture becomes the basis for distinction between the white supremacists and the liberals. Culture, unlike biology, should allow us to seek liberation from cruel and uncomfortable practices. But instead, culture wraps us in its suffocating embrace. If we follow liberalism of the skin, then we find ourselves heir to all the dilemmas of multiculturalism: Are cultures discrete and bounded? Do cultures have a history or are they static? Who defines the boundaries of culture or allows for change? Do cultures leak into each other? Can a person from one culture critique another culture? These are the questions that plague both social science and our everyday interactions. Those who subscribe to the liberalism of the skin want to be thought well of, to be good, and therefore, many are circumspect when it comes to the culture of another. The best intentions (of respect and tolerance) can often be annoying to those whose cultures are not in dominance: we feel that we are often zoological specimens. To respect the fetish of culture assumes that one wants to enshrine it in the museum of humankind rather than find within it the potential for liberation or for change. We'd have to accept homophobia and sexism, class cruelty and racism, all in the service of being respectful to someone's perverse definition of a culture. For comfortable liberals a critique of multiculturalism is close to heresy, but for those of us who have to tussle both with the cruelty of white supremacy and with the melancholic torments of minoritarianism, the critique comes with ease. The orthodoxy of below bears less power than that from above, but it is unbearable nonetheless. We have already begun to grow our own patchwork, defiant skins. These defiant skins come under the sign of the polycultural, a provisional concept grounded in antiracism rather than in diversity. Polyculturalism, unlike multiculturalism, assumes that people live coherent lives that are made up of a host of lineages – the task of the historian is not to carve out the lineages but to make sense of how people live culturally dynamic lives. Polyculturalism is a ferocious engagement

with the political world of culture, a painful embrace of the skin and all its contradictions. To show us what this polyculturalism means in practice, I offer three passages into the world of Afro-Asia: first into the Caribbean with descendants of formerly enslaved Africans and Asian coolies, then into the urban zones that house a working class rife with ethnic squabbles, and finally into the world of kungfu wherein nonwhite people dream of a revolution of bare fists against the heavily armed fortress of white supremacy. As the title suggests, the mongrel Afro-Asian history recounted in *Everybody Was Kung Fu Fighting* does not require detached observation.

It demands that we actively search for the grounds toward intervention by each of us into the cultural worlds that unite and divide us. I hope the history that follows offers the possibility of an enhanced solidarity, not only between Africans and Asians (who are the subjects here), but among all people (whose existence in the history should be written by you as you read through). This is a movement book, so move along . . .

Text for reading to unit II.

Текст для чтения к модулю II

From *Samovar, L. Intercultural Communication: a reader / L. Samovar, R. Porter, E. Mcdaniel. – 13th ed. – Wadsworth / Cengage Learning, 2012. [Electronic resource]. Mode of access : <https://www.twirpx.com/file/146062/>.*

Chapter 1 Approaches to Intercultural Communication

...What is Culture?

Culture is an extremely popular and increasingly overused term in contemporary society. Expressions such as cultural differences, cultural diversity, multiculturalism, corporate culture, cross-culture, and other variations continually appear in the popular media. Culture has been linked to such fields as corporate management, health care, psychology, education, public relations, marketing, and advertising. We often hear about U.S. forces operating in Afghanistan with insufficient knowledge and understanding of the local culture. The pervasive use of the term culture attests to the increased awareness of the role it plays in our everyday activities. Seldom, however, are we given a definition of just what constitutes culture or exactly what culture does. This section will provide that information.

Explaining Culture. As with communication, the term culture has been the subject of numerous and often complex, abstract definitions. What is frequently counted as one of the earliest and easily understandable definitions of culture, and one still used today, was written in 1871 by British anthropologist Sir Edward Burnett Tylor, who said culture is “that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society”. Ruth Benedict offered a more succinct definition when she wrote, “What really binds men together is their culture – the ideas and the standards they have in common”. A more complex explanation was provided by Clifford Geertz, who said culture was “a historically transmitted

pattern of meaning embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life". Contemporary definitions of culture commonly mention shared values, attitudes, beliefs, behaviors, norms, material objects, and symbolic resources (e.g., Gardiner & Kosmitzki, 2008; Jandt, 2009; Klyukanov, 2005; Lustig & Koester, 2009; Martin & Nakayama, 2010; Neuliep, 2008; Oetzel, 2008; Samovar, et al., 2009). Indeed, the many and varied definitions attest to the complexity of this social concept called culture. We propose an applied and hopefully more simplified explanation of culture. Stop for a minute and think about the word football. What mental picture comes to mind? Most U.S. Americans will envision two teams of eleven men each in helmets and pads, but someone in Montréal, Canada, would imagine twelve men per team. A resident of Sidney, Australia, may think of two eighteen-man teams in shorts and jerseys competing to kick an oblong ball between two uprights, while a young woman in Sao Paulo, Brazil, would probably picture two opposing teams of eleven men, or women, attempting to kick a round ball into a net. In each case, the contest is referred to as "football," but the playing fields, equipment, and rules of each game are quite different. Try to think about how you would react in the following situations. Following your successful job interview with a large Chinese company, you are invited to dinner. At the restaurant, you sit at a round table with other people, and plates of food are continually being placed on a turntable in the table's center. People are spinning the turntable, taking food from different dishes, talking with each other, and urging you to try items you are completely unfamiliar with. How do you feel? At a later date, one of your close friends, whose parents immigrated from Mumbai, India, invites you to his home for the first time. There, you are introduced to your friend's grandfather, who places his palms together in front of his chest as if praying, bows and says namaste. What do you do? In each of these examples, perhaps you felt unsure of what to do or say, yet in China and India, these behaviors are routine. These examples illustrate our applied definition of culture. Simply stated, culture is the

rules for living and functioning in society. In other words, culture provides the rules for playing the game of life (Gudykunst, 2004; Yamada, 1997). Because the rules differ from culture to culture, in order to function and be effective in a particular culture, you need to know how to “play by the rules.” We learn the rules of our own culture as a matter of course, beginning at birth and continuing throughout life. As a result, own culture rules are ingrained in the subconscious, enabling us to react to familiar situations without thinking. It is when you enter another culture, with different rules, that problems are encountered.

What Culture Does. If we accept the idea that culture can be viewed as a set of societal rules, its purpose becomes self-evident. Cultural rules provide a framework that gives meaning to events, objects, and people. The rules enable us to make sense of our surroundings and reduce uncertainty about the social environment. Recall the first time you were introduced to someone you were attracted to. You probably felt some level of nervousness because you wanted to make a positive impression. During the interaction, you may have had a few thoughts about what to do and what not to do. Overall, you had a good idea of the proper courtesies, what to talk about, and generally how to behave. This is because you had learned the proper cultural rules of behavior by listening to and observing others. Now, take that same situation and imagine being introduced to a student from a different country, such as Jordan or Kenya. Would you know what to say and do? Would the cultural rules you had been learning since childhood be effective, or even appropriate, in this new social situation? Culture also provides us with our identity, or sense of self. From childhood, we are inculcated with the idea of belonging to a variety of groups – family, community, church, sports teams, schools, and ethnicity – and these memberships form our different identities. Our cultural identity is derived from our “sense of belonging to a particular cultural or ethnic group”, which may be Chinese, Mexican American, African American, Greek, Egyptian, Jewish, or one or more of many, many other possibilities. Growing up, we learn the rules of social conduct appropriate to our specific cultural group, or groups in the case of multicultural families such as

Vietnamese American, Italian American, or Russian American. Cultural identity can become especially prominent during interactions between people from different cultural groups, such as a Pakistani Muslim and an Indian Hindu, who have been taught varied values, beliefs, and different sets of rules for social interaction. Thus, cultural identity can be a significant factor in the practice of intercultural communication.

Culture's Components. While there are many explanations of what culture is and does, there is general agreement on what constitutes its major characteristics. An examination of these characteristics will provide increased understanding of the abstract, multifaceted concept and also offer insight into how communication is influenced by culture.

Culture Is Learned. At birth, we have no knowledge of the many societal rules needed to function effectively in our culture, but we quickly begin to internalize this information. Through interactions, observations, and imitation, the proper ways of thinking, feeling, and behaving are communicated to us. Being taught to eat with a fork, a pair of chopsticks or even one's fingers is learning cultural behavior. Attending a Catholic mass on Sunday or praying at a Jewish Synagogue on Saturday is learning cultural behaviors and values. Celebrating Christmas, Kwanzaa, Ramadan, or Yon Kippur is learning cultural traditions. Culture is also acquired from art, proverbs, folklore, history, religion, and a variety of other sources. This learning, often referred to as enculturation, is both conscious and subconscious, and has the objective of teaching us how to function properly within our cultural milieu.

Culture Is Transmitted Intergenerationally. Spanish philosopher George Santayana wrote, "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." He was certainly not referring to culture, which exists only if it is remembered and repeated by people. You learned your culture from family members, teachers, peers, books, personal observations, and a host of media sources. The appropriate way to act, what to say, and things to value were all communicated to the members of your generation by these

many sources. You are also a source for passing these cultural expectations, usually with little or no variation, to succeeding generations. Culture represents our link to the past and, through future generations, hope for the future. The critical factor in this equation is communication.

Culture Is Symbolic. Words, gestures, and images are merely symbols used to convey meaning. It is our ability to use these symbols that allows us to engage in the many forms of social intercourse used to construct and convey culture. Our symbol-making ability facilitates learning and enables transmission of meaning from one person to another, group to group, and generation to generation. In addition to transmitting meaning, the portability of symbols creates the ability to store information, which allows cultures to preserve what is considered important and to create a history. The preservation of culture provides each new generation with a road map to follow and a reference library to consult when unknown situations are encountered. Succeeding generations may modify established behaviors or values, or construct new ones, but the accumulation of past traditions is what we know as culture.

Culture Is Dynamic. Despite its historical nature, culture is never static. Within a culture, new ideas, inventions, and exposure to other cultures create change. Discoveries such as the stirrup, gunpowder, the nautical compass, penicillin, and nuclear power are demonstrations of culture's susceptibility to innovation and new ideas. More recently, advances made by minority groups, the women's movement, and gay rights advocates have significantly altered the fabric of contemporary U.S. society. Invention of the computer chip and the Internet and the discovery of DNA have brought profound changes not only to U.S. culture but also to the rest of the world. Diffusion, or cultural borrowing, is also a source of change. Think about how common pizza (Italian), sushi (Japanese), tacos (Mexican), and tandoori chicken and naan bread (India) now are in the U.S. American diet. The Internet has accelerated cultural diffusion by making new knowledge and insights easily accessible. Immigrants bring their own cultural practices, traditions, and artifacts, some of which become incorporated into the

culture of their new homeland – for example, Vietnamese noodle shops in the United States, Indian restaurants in England, or Japanese foods in Brazil. Cultural calamities, such as war, political upheaval, or large-scale natural disasters, can cause change. U.S. intervention in Afghanistan is bringing greater equality to the women of that nation. For better or worse, the invasion of Iraq raised the influence of Shia and Kurdish cultural practices and lessened those of the Sunni. International emergency relief workers responding to the earthquake in Haiti brought their own cultural practices to the situation, some of which have likely become intermingled with the cultural practices of the native Haitians. Immigration is a major source of cultural diffusion. Many of the large U.S. urban centers now have areas unofficially, or sometimes officially, called Little Italy, Little Saigon, Little Tokyo, Korea Town, Chinatown, Little India, etc. These areas are usually home to restaurants, markets, and shops catering to a specific ethnic group. However, they also serve to introduce different cultural practices into other segments of the population. Most of the changes affecting culture, especially readily visible changes, are often topical in nature, such as dress, food preference, modes of transportation, or housing. Values, ethics, morals, the importance of religion, or attitudes toward gender, age, and sexual orientation, which constitute the deep structures of culture, are far more resistant to major change and tend to endure from generation to generation.

Culture Is Ethnocentric. The strong sense of group identity, or attachment, produced by culture can also lead to ethnocentrism, the tendency to view one's own culture as superior to other cultures. Ethnocentrism can arise from one's enculturation. Being continually told that you live in the greatest country in the world, that America's way of life is better than those of other nations, or that your values are superior to those of other ethnic groups can lead to feelings of cultural superiority, especially among children. Ethnocentrism can also result from a lack of contact with other cultures. If you were exposed only to a U.S. cultural orientation, it is likely that you would develop the idea that your country is the

center of the world, and you would tend to view the rest of the world from the perspective of U.S. culture.

An inability to understand or accept different ways and customs can also provoke feelings of ethnocentrism. It is quite natural to feel at ease with people who are like you and adhere to the same social norms and protocols. You know what to expect, and it is usually easy to communicate. It is also normal to feel uneasy when confronted with new and different social values, beliefs, and behaviors. You do not know what to expect, and communication is probably difficult. However, to view or evaluate those differences negatively simply because they vary from your expectations is a product of ethnocentrism, and an ethnocentric disposition is detrimental to effective intercultural communication.

...Beliefs, Values, and Attitudes. Beliefs can be defined as individually held subjective ideas about the nature of an object or event. These subjective ideas are, in large part, a product of culture, and they directly influence our behaviors. Bullfighting is thought to be cruel and inhumane by most people in the United States, but certainly not by the many people in Spain and Mexico who love the sport. A strict adherent of Judaism or Islam would probably find the thought of eating a ham sandwich repulsive. Regarding religion, many people believe that there is only one god but others pay homage to multiple deities. Values represent those things we hold important in life, such as morality, ethics, and aesthetics. We use values to distinguish between the desirable and the undesirable. Each person has a set of unique, personal values and a set of shared, cultural values. The latter are a reflection of the rules a culture has established to reduce uncertainty, lessen the likelihood of conflict, help in decision making, and provide structure to social organization and interactions. Cultural values are a motivating force behind our behaviors. Someone from a culture that places a high value on harmonious social relations, such as Japan, will likely employ an indirect communication style. In contrast, a U.S. American can be expected to use a more direct style, because frankness, honesty, and openness are valued. Our beliefs and values push us to hold certain attitudes, which are learned tendencies to act or respond in a specific

way to events, objects, people, or orientations. Culturally instilled beliefs and values exert a strong influence on our attitudes. Thus, people tend to embrace what is liked and avoid what is disliked. Someone from a culture that considers cows sacred will take a negative attitude toward your invitation to have a Big Mac for lunch.

Worldview. Although quite abstract, the concept of worldview is among the most important elements of the perceptual attributes influencing intercultural communication. Stated simply, worldview is what forms people's orientation toward such philosophical concepts as deities, the universe, nature, and the like. Normally, worldview is deeply imbedded in one's psyche and operates on a subconscious level. This can be problematic in an intercultural situation, where conflicting worldviews can come into play. As an example, many Asian and Native North American cultures hold a worldview that people should have a harmonious, symbiotic relationship with nature. In contrast, Euro-Americans are instilled with the concept that people must conquer and mold nature to conform to personal needs and desires. Individuals from nations possessing these two contrasting worldviews could well encounter difficulties when working to develop an international environmental protection plan. The concept of democracy, with everyone having an equal voice in government, is an integral part of the U.S. worldview. Contrast this with Afghanistan and parts of Africa, where worldviews hold that one's tribe takes precedence over the central government.

Text for reading to unit V.

Текст для чтения к модулю V

From Hall, E. The Hidden Dimension / E. Hall. – 1990. – pp.60-63.

Tactile Space

Touch and visual spatial experiences are so interwoven that the two cannot be separated. Think for a moment how young children and infants reach, grasp, fondle, and mouth everything, and how many years are required to train children to subordinate the world of touch to the visual world. Commenting on space perception, the artist Braque distinguished between visual and tactile space thus: “tactile” space separates the viewer from objects while “visual” space separates objects from each other. Emphasizing the difference between these two types of space and their relations to the experience of space, he said that “scientific” perspective is nothing but an eye-fooling trick – a bad trick – which makes it impossible for the artist to convey the full experience of space. James Gibson, the psychologist, also relates vision to touch. He states that if we conceive of the two as channels of information in which the subject is actively exploring (scanning) with both senses, the flow of sense impressions is reinforced. Gibson distinguishes between active touch (tactile scanning) and passive touch (being touched). He reports that active touch enabled subjects to reproduce abstract objects that were screened from view with 95 per cent accuracy. Only 49 per cent accuracy was possible with passive touch. Michael Balint, writing in the *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, describes two different perceptual worlds, one sight oriented, the other touch oriented. Balint sees the touch oriented as both more immediate and more friendly than the sight oriented world in which space is friendly but is filled with dangerous and unpredictable objects (people). In spite of all that is known about the skin as an information-gathering device, designers and engineers have failed to grasp the deep significance of touch, particularly active touch. They have not understood how important it is to keep the person related to the world in which he lives. Consider Detroit's broad-base

behemoths that clog our roads. Their great size, davenport seats, soft springs, and insulation make each ride an act of sensory deprivation. American automobiles are designed to give as little feeling of the road as possible. Much of the joy of riding in sports cars or even a good European sedan is the sense of being in contact with the vehicle as well as with the road. One of the attractions of sailing, in the view of many enthusiasts, is the interplay of visual, kinesthetic, and tactile experiences. A friend who sails tells me that unless he has the tiller in his hand, he has very little feeling of what is happening to the boat. There is no doubt that sailing provides its many devotees with a renewed sense of being in contact with something, a feeling we are denied by our increasingly insulated, automated life. In times of disaster, the need to avoid physical contact can be crucial. I am not speaking about those incidents of critical overcrowding that induce disaster, like the slave ships with 1.1 to 8.0 square feet per person, but supposedly “normal” situations in subways, elevators, air-raid shelters, hospitals, and prisons. Most of the data used to establish criteria for crowding are inappropriate because they are too extreme. Lacking definitive measures, those who study crowding repeatedly fall back on incidents in which the crowding has been so extreme as to result in insanity or death. As more and more is learned about both men and animals, it becomes clearer that the skin itself is a very unsatisfactory boundary or measuring point for crowding. Like the moving molecules that make up all matter, living things move and therefore require more or less fixed amounts of space. Absolute zero, the bottom of the scale, is reached when people are so compressed that movement is no longer possible. Above this point, the containers in which man finds himself either allow him to move about freely or else cause him to jostle, push, and shove. How he responds to this jostling, and hence to the enclosed space, depends on how he feels about being touched by strangers. Two groups with which I have had some experience – the Japanese and the Arabs – have much higher tolerance for crowding in public spaces and in conveyances than do Americans and northern Europeans. However, Arabs and Japanese are apparently more concerned about their own requirements for the spaces they live in than are

Americans. The Japanese, in particular, devote much time and attention to the proper organization of their living space for perception by all their senses. Texture, about which I have said very little, is appraised and appreciated almost entirely by touch, even when it is visually presented. With few exceptions (to be mentioned later) it is the memory of tactile experiences that enables us to appreciate texture. So far, only a few designers have paid much attention to the importance of texture, and its use in architecture is largely haphazard and informal. In other words, textures on and in buildings are seldom used consciously and with psychological or social awareness. The Japanese, as the objects they produce indicate so clearly, are much more conscious of the significance of texture. A bowl that is smooth and pleasing to touch communicates not only that the artisan cared about the bowl and the person who was going to use it but about himself as well. The rubbed wood finishes produced by medieval craftsmen also communicated the importance they attached to touch. Touch is the most personally experienced of all sensations. For many people, life's most intimate moments are associated with the changing textures of the skin. The hardened, armorlike resistance to the unwanted touch, or the exciting, ever-changing textures of the skin during love-making, and the velvet quality of satisfaction afterward are messages of one body to another that have universal meanings. Man's relationship to his environment is a function of his sensory apparatus plus how this apparatus is conditioned to respond. Today, one's unconscious picture of one's self – the life one leads, the minute-to-minute process of existence – is constructed from the bits and pieces of sensory feedback in a largely manufactured environment. A review of the immediate receptors reveals first that Americans who live urban and suburban lives have less and less opportunity for active experiences of either their bodies or the spaces they occupy. Our urban spaces provide little excitement or visual variation and virtually no opportunity to build a kinesthetic repertoire of spatial experiences. It would appear that many people are kinesthetically deprived and even cramped. In addition, the automobile is carrying the process of alienation from both the body

and the environment one step further. One has the feeling that the automobile is at war with the city and possibly with mankind itself. Two additional sensory capacities, the great sensitivity of the skin to changes in heat and texture, not only act to notify the individual of emotional changes in others but feed back to him information of a particularly personal nature from his environment. Man's sense of space is closely related to his sense of self, which is in an intimate transaction with his environment. Man can be viewed as having visual, kinesthetic, tactile, and thermal aspects of his self which may be either inhibited or encouraged to develop by his environment.

Text for reading to unit VI.

Текст для чтения к модулю VI

From Rosch, E.H. *Linguistic relativity* / E.H. Rosch // *Human Communication. Theoretical Perspective* ; E. Silverstein (ed.) – Hillsdale, NJ : Lawrence Erlbaum, 1974 (shortened).

Linguistic Relativity

According to linguistic relativity, it is naïve to think that when we learn a “foreign” language, we simply learn a new vocabulary to name the same objects and a new grammar to express the same relations between objects as exist in our own language. Rather, “the background linguistic system ... of each language is not merely a reproducing instrument for voicing ideas but rather is itself the shaper of ideas . . . We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native language. The categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds – and this means . . . by the linguistic system in our minds” (B. Whorf).

When many of us first came in contact with the Whorfian hypothesis, it seemed not only profoundly true. We felt we could look inward and see our comprehension of the world molded by language just as we could “watch” as our personalities were irrevocably shaped by society and upbringing. But profound and ineffable truths are not, in that form, subject investigation. Is linguistic relativity an empirical “theory”? If so, it must be possible to derive from it concrete statements about specific relations of actual languages to the thought of the people that speak them; and these statements must be of a type which can be judged true or false by comparing them to facts about those actual languages and thoughts.

There are a number of important distinctions within the Whorfian position which lead to differing empirical implications. Relatively “weak” or “strong” claims may be asserted about the role of language in thought: at the weak extreme is the simple claim that both language differences necessarily cause (are necessary and sufficient conditions for) thought differences. The stronger claim is sometimes called Linguistic Determinism to distinguish it from the less specific Linguistic Relativity.

Covert Linguistic Classifications

Language as Metaphysics

The strongest and most inclusive form of the Whorfian hypothesis (and the only form, perhaps, that Whorf would today recognize) is that each language both embodies and imposes upon the culture a particular world view. Thus, in English and other “Standard Average European” tongues, the basic unit of reality are objects (nouns), composed of substance and form, and actions (verbs) – both of which exist in an objective, three-dimensional space (expressed by such linguistic devices as locatives) and a “kinetic one-dimensional uniformly and perpetually flowing time” (expressed by forms such as tense). In the Hopi language, however, things and actions are not distinguished; rather, they are both Events, differentiated only according to duration. Even to say that about Hopi may be misleading, for rather than substance, motion, space, and time, Hopi grammar divides the universe by two great “principles,” “Manifested” (Objective) and “Unmanifest” (Subjective). “Manifested” comprises all that is or has been accessible to the senses, while “Unmanifest” (Subjective) includes, as one group, all that we call future and all that we call mental, including that which is perceived as future-potential-mental in the “heart” of men, animals, plants, inanimate objects, and the Cosmos. Whorf provides variety of translations of statements in various Indian languages into English to show how unlike ours are the thought processes of speakers of those languages. Thus, in Apache, “It is a dripping spring” is expressed by “As water, or springs, whiteness moves

downward.” In Shawnee, “cleaning gun with a ramrod” is “direct a hollow moving dry spot by movement of tool.”

As a linguist, Whorf found the grammar of several American Indian languages to differ from English grammar to such an extent that literal translations between those languages and English made no sense. The literal translations, given above, of “a dripping spring” and “cleaning a gun with a ramrod” do, indeed, appear to be products of a very alien mode of thought. Of course, it is also true that all languages have somewhat different grammars, even the languages which Whorf calls “Standard Average European.” However, notice that when we learn French, we are taught to translate “Comment allez vous?” not literally as “How go you?” but as the standard English greeting to which it corresponds, “How are you?” And if a student translates “le chat gris” as “the cat gray,” he is told he has made an error; in English, modifiers come before the noun, not after, and the correct rendition of the phrase in English is “the gray cat.”

The words (actually, the morphemes, or units of meaning) of any language can be divided into classes of grammatical equivalents on the basis of the positions which they can occupy in word sequences (such as sentences). The most basic units of grammar, which Whorf claimed formed the basis of the metaphysics of a language, are none other than the most general form classes of the language – in English the parts of speech such as nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs. Many form classes are more limited in scope than the basic “parts of speech”: gender defines classes of nouns in French; English nouns are either “mass” (occur in the position “Some X”) or “count” (occur in the position “An X”); and in Navajo, verbs of handling take a different form depending on the nature of the objects handled. Obviously, form classes are not the same in all languages.

As long as form classes are considered only “structural” (defined only by position of occurrence in sentences), they do not suggest important cognitive differences between speakers of different languages. However, Whorf and others have stressed that form classes also have semantic (meaning) correlates. Thus,

nouns are seen as substances; verbs as actions; mass nouns as indefinite, uncontained, flowing masses of matter; count nouns as singular, self-contained objects; gender as masculine, feminine, and neuter; and Navajo verb stem classifiers as shape types (round, long, granular, etc.). Generally, the members of a linguistic community are unconscious of the semantics of form class. For example, even in a relatively grammatically self-conscious society like ours, most people have never spontaneously noticed the distinction between mass and count nouns, nor ever thought about which English verbs can or cannot take the prefix “un-.” Whorf speaks of the semantic correlates of form classes (he calls them “cryptotypes”) as the “covert categories,” the “underlying concepts” of the language. In fact, it is the pervasive, covert influence of cryptotypes on thought which may be one relatively concrete interpretation of what it might mean for grammar to influence metaphysics.

The semantic interpretation of form class has not gone unchallenged. Descriptive linguistics considers the relation between structurally defined form classes and their semantic correlates highly dubious (cf. Fries, 1952). Semantic definitions of form class are always unclear or overextended; not all nouns are substances (e.g., “space”) nor all verbs active (e. g., “hold”); mass nouns can come in discrete units (“some bread”), and count nouns can refer to fluid masses (“a martini”); masculine and feminine gender forms are used for innumerable genderless objects; and specific Navajo shape classifiers are used for abstractions (“news” takes the round classifier).

There is, however, undoubtedly a partial correlation between some form classes and some semantics. It would be to the advantage of individuals learning a language to be aware (at some level) of these partial correlations. Roger Brown (1958) has shown that even 4-year-old children can use structural syntactic cues for guessing the semantic referent of form classes. Brown showed the children pictures in which an action, a discrete object, and an unbounded flowing mass were depicted, introducing the picture either with “This is a picture of latching” or “of a latt” or “of some latt.” The 4-year-olds easily identified the object by

means of the form-class cue. A similar experiment was performed on the form-class gender by Ervin (1959). Italian speakers living in Boston were read nonsense syllables formed with Italian gender. When subjects were asked to rate the syllables on a series of adjective scales (called the semantic differential – cf. Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957), they rated the masculine gender syllables more similar to their ratings for “man” than “woman” and vice versa. Such experiments demonstrate that we can make use of what semantic information there is in form classes when we are learning and applying words. They do not, however, prove that speakers of languages with different sets of form classes take different views of the semantic nature of the world. After all, discrete solid objects and unbounded fluids, and male and female organisms, have quite different physical properties which all peoples might well be required to take equal account of whether or not their grammar makes such distinctions.

If we wished to test whether semantic aspects of form class do affect thought, what kinds of correlates or effects on thought might we look for? In fact, there has been little systematic consideration and little research concerning this issue. One possibility is that there is a “metaphorical generalization” of the meaning from members of the form class to which it literally applies to members to which it does not apply literally at all. Thus, the French may really think of and treat tables as feminine, and the Navajo may consider news to be round. Whorf himself suggests this kind of interpretation when he claims that we read action into all words that are verbs, and, since all English sentences contain verbs, into every statement. “We therefore read action into every sentence, even into ‘I hold it’ We think of it (i.e., holding) and even see it as an action because language formulates it in the same way as it formulates more numerous expressions, like ‘I strike it,’ which deals with movements and changes.” But do we read action into all verbs? How can we tell? One test would be to go to the natural logic of language use itself; if action is begun “read into” verbs like “hold,” they should be capable of occurring modified by action adverbs just as do “true” action verbs. The actual state of such verbs is described by the philosopher Max Black: “a man

may strike slowly, jerkily, energetically, and so on. Now if somebody were to attach these adverbs to the verb 'to hold' that would be sufficient indication that he was 'reading action' into the verb. I suppose a child might say he was holding his hat slowly, and the poet is allowed a similar license; but otherwise the conceptual confusion is too gross to occur."

Are there any cases in which the partially correlated semantics of a form class are extended to other words that happen to be in that class? Is there a systematic way of studying such extensions so that we might conclude that it never happens? These intriguing questions remain entirely open to future investigation, and the interested student might well try using his intuition as a speaker of his own language to consider them.

A Discussion of Method

Many facts which have been offered in support of the effects of language on thought (at all levels of language) have been only descriptions of differences between cultures. To avoid such confusions, it is necessary to bear in mind the important distinction between the content of a language or culture and the thought processes of members of the culture. Of course, cultures differ in content; we would probably not call them different cultures if they did not. A rice farmer in the Phillipines and a college student in America live quite different lives, and presumably the content of their thoughts, knowledge, and memory mirror those differences in experience. But from knowing that, we cannot automatically assume that members of the two cultures operate on that content in different ways. It is probable, for example, that they forget their experiences according to the same laws of decay or interference in memory regardless of what it is that they are forgetting.

There is, of course, a sense in which any lexical difference between languages implies a difference in the content of thought of the speakers. In learning to use a term, speakers must learn the class of things to which the term refers; thus knowledge of and reference to that class of objects is part of the

content of the speaker's thought. In this sense, the weaker form of linguistic relativity (that there are differences in thought in different linguistic communities) is necessarily true. The really interesting hypothesis at the lexical level, however, is the stronger deterministic claim that lexical differences themselves affect thought processes in some manner.

It is tempting, when making claims supporting the Whorfian hypothesis at any level of language, to rely primarily on content differences. They are often very striking differences; if a language has only two color terms or thousands of elaborate distinctions and classifications for skin diseases, surely that must affect the way in which these domains are dealt with by the cognitive manipulations of the speakers. To illustrate how misleading a direct inference from lexical content can be, we may recall the even more striking differences between the Hopi grammatical classifications of things on the basis of duration and the English division into substances and actions. The evidence concerning that distinction left us in grave doubt about whether nouns and verbs are meaningful semantic cognitive categories for English speakers at all.

Most "demonstrations" of the Whorfian hypothesis have done more than simply point to differences between the content of languages; they have, in addition, identified aspects of the culture of the speakers which covary with language. Such evidence is not entirely adequate either, however, for two reasons. In the first place, covariation does not determine the direction of causality. On the simplest level, cultures are very likely to have names for physical objects which exist in their culture and not to have names for objects outside of their experience. Where television sets exist, there are words to refer to them. However, it would be difficult to argue that the objects are caused by the words. The same reasoning probable holds in the case of institutions and other, more abstract, entities and their names. In the second place, covariation between cultural content and language content neither proves the further existence of covarying cognitive processes nor would it determine the direction of causality even were such covariation to be demonstrated. Thus, if Eskimos were shown both to have more

names for snow than Americans and to remember different types of snow better than Americans, both might simply be due to the fact that there is more snow in the Arctic and to Eskimos having more active experience with it than Americans; it would not have been proved that the greater number of words per se affected the memory.

The preceding argument has stressed the point that cognitive processes must be measured independently of, and not simply deduced from, linguistic or cultural content. However, this raises a second major problem of method: How are we to define and measure cognitive processes cross-culturally? Too often such measurement is based on a psychometric “deficit” model. Hypotheses are stated in terms of “how well” entire cultures perform on a particular test. For example, a hypothesis might state that “members of traditional cultures cannot think creatively” or that “the more words a language has for color, the better speakers can remember color.” The investigator might administer a test of “creative thinking” to Americans (not a traditional culture) and to the Yemenites (a traditional culture), or might administer a color memory test to Americans (many color terms) and to the Dani (few color terms). When the Yemenites performed poorly on the creativity test and the Dani poorly on the color memory test, the investigator would conclude that his causal hypothesis was supported. However, it should be obvious that innumerable other factors besides those in which the investigator is explicitly interested vary between “us” and “them.” Motivations, cultural meaningfulness of the materials, general familiarity with, or even previous explicit training with, the kind of task used are some obvious examples. In fact, any preliterate culture will probably perform “less well” than a Western culture given almost any Western “test.” But if Dani can be expected to perform below Americans in any memory test, how may we conclude that it was the number of color terms which determined their poor performance in the color memory test? In short, positive results are assured the investigator who frames hypotheses such that a single Western and single non-Western culture are

compared, with a prediction in the direction of the non-Western culture giving poorer performance than the Western – but such results will be uninterpretable.

Are there ways out of the impasse? One trend has been to try invent tasks which are as culturally relevant in content and form of administration to a particular preliterate culture as Western tests are to Western cultures. This excellent idea has, however, given rise to a special sort of circular “dialectic.” The format of the research is typically this: Stage I – an investigator demonstrates that the people of “Culture X” fail to exhibit some ability (for example, “abstract thinking”) on a standard Western test. Stage 2 – the same or a different investigator manipulates the content and context of the test until he has demonstrated that, under the right circumstances (for example, if asked to reason about animal husbandry in their own culture rather than about colored geometric forms), the people of Culture X do exhibit “abstract thinking.” The Stage 2 demonstration may be beautiful in its ingenuity; however, the two stages tend simply to cancel each other and make little contribution to our understanding of basic human thought processes. It ought to go without saying that all tasks in cross-cultural research should be as appropriate for the people taking them as possible and, indeed, some level of appropriateness is essential if any meaningful data are to be collected at all. However, culturally meaningful tasks do not of themselves produce well – conceived research; why should hypotheses be framed in terms of differences in absolute level of performance between “us” and “them” at all?

Perhaps the simplest and most direct way of circumventing the problem of measuring cognitive variables cross-culturally, is to abandon research designs whose emphasis is on “main effects” of culture per se. Hypotheses can be formed, not in terms of absolute differences between cultures, but in terms of interactions between variables within and between cultures. Take, for example, the hypothesis that the number of color terms affects color memory. Instead of comparing speakers of two languages one of which has more color terms than the other, we might search for cases where it is possible to compare relative performance for

different areas of the color space for languages which differed in the relative number of terms they had for these areas. Perhaps one language has many terms for blue and green colors but few terms for the yellow-brown color area, another language just the opposite. Our prediction could then be that speakers of the first language would show relatively better memory for the blue-green than for the yellow-brown area; whereas, speakers of the second language would be relatively more proficient with yellow- brown colors than with blue-green. With research so designed, it would not matter how well either culture remembered color terms in total. Such an approach may be a key to meaningful comparisons, even between quite different cultures.

To return to the Whorfian hypothesis: it should by now be apparent that many factors are necessary in order to have a real test of the effects of a natural language lexicon on thought. (a) We must have at least two natural languages whose lexicons differ with respect to some domain of discourse – if languages are not different, there is no point in the investigation. (b) The domain must be one which can be measured by the investigator independently of the way it is encoded by the languages of concern (for example, color may be measured in independent physical units such as wavelength)–if that is not the case (as, for example, in such domains as feelings or values), there is no objective way of describing how it is that the two languages differ. (c) The domain must not itself differ grossly between the cultures whose languages differ – if it does, then it may be differences in experience with the domain, and not language, which are affecting thought. (d) We must be able to obtain measures of specific aspects of cognition – such as perception, memory, or classification – having to do with the domain which are independent of, rather than simply assumed from, the language. (e) We must have a cross-culturally meaningful measure of differences in the selected aspects of cognition – preferably we should be able to state the hypotheses in terms of an interaction between the linguistic and cognitive variables, rather than in terms of overall differences between speakers of the languages.

It may seem a long way from the initial introduction of linguistic relativity as an assertion about differences in “world view” to a study of the possible cognitive effects of differences in color terms. The transition was made necessary by the requirement that assertions be made in the forms of empirically testable hypotheses. Much of the remainder of this chapter will trace the history of language-cognition research in the domain of colors, the primary domain in which such research has been carried out.

The first, almost trivial requirement for testing the Whorfian hypothesis which we listed previously was that there be at least two natural languages whose terminologies with respect to some domain were different. The anthropological literature contains many reports of such differences in color names – for example, cultures which have only one word to describe the colors which English distinguishes as “green” and “blue,” or cultures whose word for “orange” includes much of what we would classify as “red.” From this kind of evidence, it appeared that languages could arbitrarily cut up the color space into quite different categories. Recently, two anthropologists have challenged this assumption.

Berlin and Kay (1969) first looked at the reported diversity of color names linguistically, and claimed that there were actually a very limited number of basic – as opposed to secondary – color terms in any language. “Basic” was defined by a list of linguistic criteria: for example, that a term be composed of only a single unit of meaning (“red” as opposed to “dark red”), and that it name only color and not objects (“purple” as opposed to “wine”). Using these criteria, Berlin and Kay reported that no language contained more than 11 basic color names: three achromatic (in English, “black,” “white,” and “gray”) and eight chromatic (in English, “red,” “yellow,” “green,” “blue,” “pink,” “orange,” “brown,” and “purple”).

Berlin and Kay next asked speakers of different languages to identify the colors to which the basic color names in their language referred. Their initial group of subjects were 20 foreign students whose native language was not English. Subjects saw a two-dimensional array of colored chips – all of the hues

at all levels of brightness (all at maximum saturation) available in the Munsell Book of Color (Munsell Color Company, 1966). The students performed two tasks: (a) they traced the boundaries of each of their native language's basic color terms, and (b) they pointed to the chip which was the best example of each basic term. As might have been expected from the anthropological literature, there was a great deal of variation in the placement of boundaries of the terms. There was not, however, reliable variation. Speakers of the same language disagreed with each other in placement of the boundaries as much as did speakers of different languages; and the same person, when asked to map boundaries a second time, was likely that even anthropological reports of differences in the boundaries of color terms are confounded by this unreliability. Surprisingly, in spite of this variation, the choice of best examples of the terms was quite similar for the speakers of the 20 different languages. Berlin and Kay called the point in the color space where choices of best examples of basic terms clustered "focal points," and argued that the previous anthropological emphasis on cross-cultural differences in color names was derived from looking at boundaries of color names rather than at color-name focal points.

Berlin and Kay's claim about the number of basic color terms was that there were never more than, but could be fewer than, 11 terms; in fact, they argued that color terms entered languages in a specific evolutionary order. The Dani of West Irian (Indonesian New Guinea) are a stone-age, agricultural people who have a basically two-term color language Berlin and Kay's proposed evolutionary ordering of color systems. For Dani, the eight chromatic focal chips were not more codable than the internominal chips (established by having 40 Dani name all of the color chips in the Berlin and Kay array).

This study also illustrates a point about method which was emphasized earlier. A striking aspect is that Dani memory performance as a whole was poorer than American. If the hypothesis had been in terms of absolute differences between cultures, we would have noted that Dani both had fewer color terms and poorer memory for colors than Americans, and might have claimed that linguistic

relativity was thereby supported. However, it must be remembered that the Dani are a preliterate people, living in face-to-face communities, probable without need for or training in techniques for coping with the kind of overloads of information which this unfamiliar memory test required. All of those extraneous factors undoubtedly affected Dani memory performance as a whole. Our hypothesis however, concerned differential memory for different types of color within culture and, therefore, was not negated by general cultural differences in “test taking.”

Color initially appeared to be an ideal domain in which to demonstrate the effects of lexical differences on thought; instead, it now appears to be a domain particularly suited to an examination of the influence of underlying perceptual factors on the formation and reference of linguistic categories. Certain colors appear to be universally salient. There are also universals in some aspects of color naming. How (by what mechanism) might the saliency be related to the naming? What we are asking for is an account of the development (both in the sense of individual learning and the evolution of languages) of color names which will specify the precise nature of the role played by focal colors in that development.

Rosch (1973) proposed the following account of the development of color names; there are perceptually salient colors which more readily attract attention (even of young children – Heider, 1971) and are more easily remembered than other colors. When category names are learned, they tend to become attached first to the salient stimuli (only later generalizing to other, physically similar, instances), and by this means these “natural prototype” colors become the foci of organization for categories. How can this account be tested? In the first place, it implies that it is easier to learn names for focal than for nonfocal colors. That is, not only should focal colors be more easily retained than nonfocal in recognition over short intervals (as has already been demonstrated), but they should also be more readily remembered in conjunction with names in long-term memory. In the second place, since a color category is learned first as a single named focal color and second as that focal color plus other physically similar colors, color

categories in which focal colors are physically central stimuli (“central” in terms of some physical attribute, such as wavelength) should be easier to learn than categories structured in some other manner (for example, focal colors physically peripheral, or internominal colors central, and no focal colors at all).

A test of these hypotheses obviously could not be performed with subjects who already knew a set of basic chromatic color terms provided by their language. This brings us to another important possible method for cross-cultural research which has seldom been applied—a learning paradigm. The Dani, with their two-term color language, provided an ideal opportunity to teach color names. Three basic types of color category were taught. In Type 1, the physically central (i.e., of intermediate value in wavelength or brightness) chip of each category was the focal color. In Type 2, central chips lay in the internominal areas between Berlin and Kay’s best-example clusters. Type 3 categories were located in the same space as Type 1; however, instead of occupying a central position, the focal color was now to one side or the other of the three-chip category.

Subjects learned the color names as a paired-associate task, a standard learning task in which subjects learn to give a specific response to each of a list of stimuli. In the present case, colors were the stimuli, and the same Dani word was the correct response for the three colors in a category. The task was described to each subject as learning a new language which the experimenter would teach him. The subject was told the “names” for all of the color chips, then presented with each chip and required to respond with a name. Chips were shown in a different random order each run, five runs a day, with feedback after each response, until the criterion of one perfect run was achieved.

The results of the learning supported Rosch’s account of the role of focal colors in the learning of color names. In the first place, the focal colors were learned with fewer errors than other colors, even when they were peripheral members of the categories. In the second place, the Type 1 categories in which focal colors were physically central were learned as a set faster than either of the other types. The Type 2 categories, which violated the presumed natural

organization of the color space, were the most difficult of all to learn. Thus, the idea of perceptually salient focal colors as “natural prototypes” (rather like Platonic forms) for the development and learning of color names was supported.

...At this point, the reader may well feel a sense of discontent. We appear to have concluded that color terminology is entirely universal. But what of color term boundaries, and what of the degree of elaboration of secondary color terms? If color terms make no difference to perception, cognitive processes, communication, or life, why should languages have any color terms at all, much less differences in terms? What are color terms used for? One theory is that we have them in order to communicate about objects which are the same except for color. All of the cultures which have fewer than the full complement of 11 basic terms are also technologically not at an industrial level. According to this theory, color terms only become necessary for communication when manufactured objects can be produced in multitudes, and coloring agents are available for imparting different colors to the otherwise identical objects. A paradigmatic situation for using color terms in this context would be to say “Bring me the orange bowl,” thereby specifying which of several, otherwise indistinguishable, bowls was desired.

But why should anyone want to specify the “orange bowl?” Think about the contexts in which you actually pay attention to subtle differences in color. They are probably activities such as deciding what articles of clothing to wear simultaneously, decorating houses, landscaping gardens, and producing and appreciating works of art.

There is one study which bears on this point. Greenfield and Childs (1971) studied the effect of knowing how to weave certain patterns in cloth upon pattern conception among the Zinacantanos of Chiapas, Mexico. The patterns consisted of simple groups of red and white threads. Subjects were asked to “copy” the pattern by placing sticks into a frame. They were given their choice of various widths and colors of sticks. While some subjects used only the red and white sticks to copy the red and white patterns, others freely substituted pink for white

and orange for red. A separate test determined that all subjects could discriminate the differences between red, orange, pink, and white sticks equally well. The important point for our argument is that it tended to be subjects who named the red, pink, orange, and white sticks with different names who adhered strictly to the red and white sticks for copying the patterns; subjects who used only a single term for white and pink and a single term for red and orange were the ones who tended to make the substitutions. It may well be that it is in little understood domains such as aesthetic judgment that the use of color terms will be found to “make a difference.” (Of course, the Zinacantecos who used differentiating terms may have done so because terms do make a difference.) This can now be explored against our background of knowledge of what is universal in color.

We began with the idea of color as the ideal domain in which to demonstrate the effects of the lexicon of a language on cognition, thereby supporting a position of linguistic determinism. Instead, we have found that basic color terminology appears to be universal and that perceptually salient focal colors appear to form natural prototypes for the development of color terms. Contrary to initial ideas, the color space appears to be a prime example of the influence of underlying perceptual-cognitive factors on linguistic categories.

Other Natural Categories

Facial expressions of emotion are a surprising addition to the class of natural categories. Not only were they once not considered universal; but there was considerable doubt that, even within one culture, emotion could be judged better than chance from the human face (Bruner & Tagiuri, 1954). As had been the case with colors, such judgments seemed to stem from the unsystematic employment of miscellaneous facial expressions in judgment experiments. Ekman (1972) claimed that there are six basic human emotions (happiness, sadness, anger, fear, surprise, and disgust) and that each is associated with a quite limited range of facial muscle movements constituting a pure expression of that emotion; other expressions tend to be blends of emotions, or ambiguous or nonemotional

expressions which could not be expected to receive reliable judgments. When Ekman put together sets of pictures of pure expressions of the proposed basic emotions, he found that these pictures were judged correctly by Americans, Japanese, Brazilians, Chileans, and Argentinians. Furthermore, two preliterate New Guinea groups with minimal contact with Caucasian facial expression, the Fore and the Dani, were able to distinguish which of the expressions was meant on the basis of stories embodying the appropriate emotion. Like color, universality was discovered in facial expressions of emotion only when an investigator thought to ask, not about all possible stimuli, but about the prototypes (best examples) of categories. As is the case for color terms, there appears to be a residual function of emotion names themselves.

It is unreasonable to expect that humans come equipped with natural prototypes in all domains. Dogs, vegetables, and Volkswagens, for example, are probable culturally relative. Yet such categories may also possess an “internal structure” which renders them more similar to color than to artificial categories. That is, the color, form, and emotional expression categories were composed of a “core meaning” (the clearest cases, best examples) of the category, “surrounded” by other category members of decreasing similarity to the core meaning. Think about the common semantic category “dog.” Which is a better example of your idea or image of what that word means (which is doggier?); a German Shepherd or a Dachshund? Rosch (1973) had college students rate members of a number of semantic categories as to their prototypicality and found high agreement in judgment between subjects. Evidence has since been obtained, in a variety of tasks, that such categories seem to be “stored mentally,” not as a list of logical criteria for category membership, but rather seem to be coded in a “shorthand” form consisting of a fairly concrete representation of the prototype (for further explanation, see Heider, 1972, and Rosch, 1973).

If internal structure and prototypes, whether “given” or learned, are important aspects in the learning and processing of semantic categories, the fact has implications for cross-cultural research. Present anthropological linguistic

techniques (for example, componential analysis) tend to emphasize discovery of the minimal and most elegant, logical criteria needed to determine membership in, and distinctions between, classes. Analysis of the best-example prototypes of categories may provide us with a new, psychologically real, and fruitful basis for comparison of categories across cultures.

Even completely aside from internal structure, given any collection of stimuli or cultural environment, it is unreasonable to expect that categories will be formed randomly. For example, there are undoubtedly psychological rules for perceiving “clusters” of stimuli and “gaps” between stimuli. Such factors as frequency of particular objects, order of encounter with the objects, “density” of nonidentical but similar stimuli, and the extent to which objects in one “cluster” are distinctively different from objects in other “clusters” are examples of the kinds of factors which might determine psychological grouping. Of course, categories of all types probable not only have labels, but also have some rationale which makes them not purely arbitrary but rather natural categories.

We began with the notion of linguistic relatively defined in terms of insurmountable differences in the world view of cultures brought about by differences in natural languages. Because of the variety of requirements for specificity and cross-cultural controls in testing such assertions, we were reduced to the far less sweeping claim that color names affect some aspects of thought. However, we discovered that colors appeared to be a domain suited to demonstrate just the opposite of linguistic relativity, namely, the effect of the human perceptual system in determining linguistic categories. Very similar evidence exists in the domains of geometric form and emotion categories. Furthermore, psychological principles of categorization may apply to the formation of all categories, even in culturally relative domains.

At present, the Whorfian hypothesis not only does not appear to be empirically true in any major respect, but it no longer even seems profoundly and ineffably true. Why has it been so difficult to demonstrate effects of language on thought? Whorf referred to language as an instrument which “dissects” and

categorizes “nature.” In the first part of the chapter, we saw that it has not been established that the categorizations provided by the grammar of the language actually correspond to meaningful cognitive units. From the latter part of the chapter, we can now see that for the vocabulary of language, in and of itself, to be a mold of thought, lexical dissections and categorizations of nature would have to be almost accidentally formed, rather as though some Johnny Apples had scattered named categories capriciously over the earth. In fact, the “effects” of most lexical linguistic categories are probably inseparable from the effects of the factors which led initially to the formation and structuring of just those categories rather than some others. It would seem a far richer task for future research to investigate the entire complex of how languages, cultures, and individuals come, in the first place, to “dissect,” “categorize,” and “name” nature in the various ways that they do.

Text for reading to unit VII.

Текст для чтения к модулю VII

Из Вежбицкая, А. Лексическая семантика в культурно-сопоставительном аспекте / А. Вежбицкая // Семантические универсалии. – М., 1999. – с. 526–545.

Laughter: смех и хохот

Как отмечается в RECDHB*, английскому слову *laughter* в русском языке соответствует не одно, а два существительных (*смех* и *хохот*), а английскому глаголу *laugh* в русском языке соответствует не один, а два глагола: *смеяться* и *хохотать*. Конечно, в английском языке есть и другие слова, обозначающие то, что может рассматриваться как разновидности смеха: *chuckle* ‘смешок, фыркнуть от смеха’, *giggle* ‘хихиканье, хихикнуть’ и *cackle* ‘хохоток, кудахтать от смеха’, – но отношение этих слов к самым базовым словам – *laugh* и *laughter* – полностью отличается от соотношения между русскими словами *хохот*, *хохотать*, с одной стороны, и *смех*, *смеяться* – с другой. На самом деле все три английских слова: *giggle*, *chuckle* и *cackle* – подразумевают нечто меньшее, чем смех от всего сердца. Из этих трех слов обозначающее непроизвольное, неконтролируемое действие слово *giggle*, имеет лексический аналог в русском языке – глагол *хихикать* (без соответствующего существительного), а обозначающие сознательные и контролируемые действия *chuckle*, и *cackle* вообще не имеют аналогов в русском языке.

В отличие от *giggle*, *chuckle* и *cackle*, *хохот*, толкуемый в RECDHB как «laughter, good laughter», представляет собою именно смех, подлинный смех, *хохотать* – значит самозабвенно, не сдерживаясь, смеяться в свое удовольствие.

□ RECDHB – *The Russian-English Collocational Dictionary of Human Body* (Русско-английский словарь коллокаций, относящихся к человеческому телу Л. Иорданской и В. Паперно, 1995).

Положение, согласно которому русский *хохот* представляет собою нечто иное, нежели «подсмеиванье», обозначаемое английскими словами *giggle*, *chuckle* и *cackle*, подтверждается упоминаемыми в RECDNB словосочетаниями, такими как следующие: умирать от хохота ‘to be dying from chuckling/cackling’, умирать от смешка/хохотка, помирать от хохота, чуть не умереть от хохота.

Очевидно, что по-английски нельзя сказать, что кто-то умирал или чуть не умер от «chuckling, cackling или giggling». (Интересно также отметить, что английские существительные *giggle*, *chuckle* и *cackle* все обозначают относительно краткие действия, тогда как русское слово *хохот* обозначает длительное действие.)

Другие глагольные выражения, упоминаемые в RECDNB, равно красноречивы: кататься от хохота, с ног валиться от хохота, хвататься за бока от хохота, трястись от хохота, живот колыхнется от хохота, на глазах слезы выступили от хохота.

Прилагательные, с которыми обычно сочетается слово *хохот*, также отличны от тех, которые вероятны в сочетании со словами *giggle*, *chuckle* или *cackle*: громкий хохот – loud *giggle/chuckle/cackle*, веселый хохот – merry (cheerful) *giggle/chuckle*; cheerful *cackle*, здоровый хохот – robust/healthy *giggle/chuckle/cackle*, дружный хохот – general (букв. harmonious, in concord) *giggle/chuckle/cackle*, раскатистый хохот – peals of *giggle/chuckle/cackle* (также: раскаты хохота).

Типичность сочетания этих прилагательных со словом *хохот* наводит на мысль, что в русской культуре громкий и несдержанный хохот не рассматривается (говорящим и, вероятно, языковым сообществом в целом) с каким-либо неодобрением, что, напротив того, он считается «здоровым». Nomina personae *хохотун* (мужчина) и *хохотунья* (женщина) особенно показательны в этом отношении, поскольку оба они подразумевают положительное отношение к лицу, о котором идет речь. Это положительное отношение, вероятно, связано с тем фактом, что *хохот* должен выражать

неподдельно «хорошие чувства». Так, если *смех*, как и *laughter*, может иногда описываться как *горький* (*bitter*) или *саркастический* (*sarcastic*), хохот употребляться в таких сочетаниях не может (горький хохот, саркастический хохот).

Поскольку слова *хохот* и *хохотать* представляют собою весьма обычные и частые в разговоре слова русского языка, то, что они специально фокусируются на громком и несдержанном смехе, дает основания предполагать особую отмеченность хохота в русской культуре: информация, которую мы можем извлечь из словарных данных, по-видимому, состоит в том, что, с точки зрения русской культуры, ожидается, что люди будут иногда – возможно, даже часто – смеяться громко и несдержанно, просто веселясь и делая это без всяких попыток контролировать телесные проявления своего хорошего настроения (такие как трясение, валение с ног, колыхания и т. д.); а также что такого рода поведение не только считается нормальным и социально приемлемым, но фактически одобряется. Отсутствие слова, подобного слову *хохот* (не говоря уже о словах *хохотун* и *хохотунья*), в словарном составе английского языка, так же как и наличие в нем слов *chuckle*, и *cackle*, дает основания полагать, что англосаксонские нормы и ожидания относительно смеха отличаются от русских.

Это дополнительно подтверждается наличием отрицательных коннотаций у английского глагола *guffaw* ‘гоготать, ржать’, который иногда приводится в русско-английских словарях в качестве эквивалента слова *хохот*. В отличие от слов *хохот* и *хохотать*, *guffaw* не является общеупотребительным словом; сама его семантика отражает неодобрение несдержанного громкого смеха (тогда как его низкая частотность дает основания полагать, что такого рода поведение рассматривается как необычное).

Рассмотрение сочетаемости русских слов *смех* и *смеяться* и их английских аналогов *laughter* и *laugh*, к которому мы теперь обратимся, указывает в том же направлении. Подобно *хохоту*, *смех* имеет целый ряд

коллокаций, которые представляют его как интенсивный и неконтролируемый, обладающий легко заметными телесными проявлениями. Эти коллокации включают следующие: разразиться смехом, надорвать себе животики, чуть не лопнуть от смеха, покатиться со смеху, чуть не умереть со смеху, закатиться смехом, прыснуть от смеха.

Хотя некоторым из указанных коллокаций могут быть поставлены в соответствие английские эквиваленты, русские выражения и более многочисленны, и более театральны. Различие особенно заметно при описании длительного, продолжающегося смеха, то есть смеха, которому человек свободно позволяет себе предаваться в течение некоторого времени, не пытаясь регулировать или остановить его. В английском языке есть несколько выражений вроде «nearly died laughing» [‘чуть не умер со смеху’], но не таких, как «was dying with (или from) laughter» [‘умирал со смеху (или от смеха)’]. Но в русском языке есть много выражений, содержащих глаголы несовершенного вида и обозначающих крайние проявления смеха, например: заливаться смехом, надрываться от смеха, умирать со смеху, помирать со смеху, давиться со смеху. Многие такие выражения предполагают видимые произвольные движения тела смеющегося человека: закатываться смехом, кататься от смеха, трястись от смеха; сотрясаться: тело сотрясается от смеха; колыхаться: живот колыхается от смеха; трястись: живот трясется от смеха; корчиться от смеха.

Итак, не только употребление слова *хохот*, но и употребление слова *смех* наводит на мысль, что несдержанный, нерегулируемый смех в большей степени отмечен в русской культуре, нежели в господствующих тенденциях англосаксонской культуры. Слово *хохот* представляет собою лексическое отражение этой культурной отмеченности, тогда как и слово *смех*, и слово *хохот* отражают ее в своем фразеологическом поведении.

Слезы

Русское слово *слезы* используется для указания на внешнее выражение эмоций значительно шире, нежели его английский аналог *tears*, и

имеет более широкий диапазон сочетаемости. Для перевода соответствующих сочетаний на английский язык часто приходится изменять смысл исходного выражения, и направление этого изменения всегда предсказуемо: оно неизменно заключается в «смягчении» исходного смысла. Один характерный литературный пример дает нам RECDBH (с. 340), приводя цитату из «Евгения Онегина» Пушкина и ее перевод на английский язык, сделанный Чарльзом Джонстоном:

<i>Княгиня перед ним, одна,</i>	<i>The princess, sitting peaked and wan</i>
<i>Сидит, не убрана, бледна,</i>	<i>Alone, with no adornment on,</i>
<i>Письмо какое-то читает</i>	<i>She holds a letter up, and leaning</i>
<i>И тихо слезы льет рекой,</i>	<i>Cheek upon hand, she softly cries</i>
<i>Опершись на руку щекой</i>	<i>In a still stream that never dries.</i>

В английском переводе княгиня плачет «тихим ручьем», но в русском оригинале она «слезы льет рекой», и это уменьшение потока слез от «реки» к «ручью» в высшей степени характерно. Например, русские выражения, обозначающие плач, включают следующие: лить слезы, проливать слезы, заливаться слезами, обливаться слезами.

Единственное английское выражение, которое можно сравнить с указанными русскими выражениями, – это *to dissolve in tears* ‘залиться слезами; букв. растворить в слезах’, но, во-первых, даже ему присущ несколько иронический или дистанцирующий тон, а во-вторых, его нельзя употребить по отношению к продолжающейся деятельности: «залиться слезами» («*dissolve in tears*») можно только один раз, тогда как по-русски все перечисленные выше выражения имеют имперфективный вариант и тем самым позволяют говорящему описывать деятельность по «заливанию слезами» как продолжающуюся, не ограниченную какими-либо временными пределами.

Выражение *весь (вся) в слезах* должно быть смягчено по-английски до простого *in tears* ‘в слезах’. Например:

Она пришла вся в слезах ‘She arrived in tears’;

Пришел домой, а мать вся в слезах ‘When I came home, I found my mother in tears’.

В русском языке есть ряд выражений, описывающих, как слезы льются из чьих-либо глаз. Эти выражения включают следующие:

течь/потечь

У N слезы текут ручьем (или в три ручья) (из глаз) *литься/политься*

У N слезы льются ручьем (или в три ручья, или рекой) (из глаз)
катиться/покатиться

У N слезы катятся (градом) (из глаз)

брызнуть

У N слезы брызнули (из глаз)

хлынуть

У N слезы хлынули (из глаз)

струиться

У N по щекам струятся слезы.

Кроме того, по-русски лицо, глаза, да и человек в целом могут быть описаны как видимым образом изменившиеся под воздействием плача. В английском переводе приходится изменять такие описания, поскольку не существует идиоматического способа передать их. Например, выражение *заплаканные глаза* передается в RECDHB как «tear-reddened eyes» [‘покрасневшие от слез глаза’], но на самом деле оно означает нечто большее: «глаза, видимым образом изменившиеся и показывающие, что человек плакал» (не просто «покрасневшие»)..

Русское выражение *до слез*, толкуемое в RECDHB как «V пока не заплачет» («V until one cries»), обычно используется для описания целого множества эмоций, включая те, которые обозначаются следующими глаголами и глагольными группами: *смеяться, хохотать, покраснеть, смущаться, обидно, завидно и досадно*. Само собою разумеется, что словосочетание «until one cries» не используется таким образом в

английском языке. По-видимому, это наводит на мысль, что слезы рассматриваются в русской культуре, в отличие от англосаксонской культуры, как обычный и общепринятый симптом целого ряда эмоций, включая, например, смущение, зависть, досаду и т. д.

К сходному выводу подводят нас следующие русские словосочетания и их английские толкования: слезы счастья «happy tears»; слезы восторга «ecstatic tears»; слезы обиды «tears of humiliation»; слезы раскаянья «tears of repentance»; слезы досады «tears of disappointment»; слезы жалости «sorrowful tears»; слезы сочувствия «tears of sympathy».

Не удивительно и то, что, как мы увидим в следующих двух разделах, многие коллокации, затрагивающие слезы, затрагивают также глаза или лицо в целом.

Face—лицо

Сочетания с русским словом *лицо*, приведенные в REGDHB, дают основания предполагать культурную позицию по отношению к выражению лица, отличную от позиции, предполагаемой общепринятыми словосочетаниями с английским словом *face*.

Прежде всего, в русском языке лицо часто описывается как «светящееся», «освещенное» или сияющее (радостью, удовольствием, восторгом и т. д.), тогда как в английском языке есть лишь одно такое выражение: *someone's face lit up* 'чье-то лицо осветилось', – которое может указывать лишь на мимолетное событие. Например: у N лицо сияет от радости (радостью), весь сиять/просиять/засиять от радости (или восторга), у N лицо осветилось (радостью), лицо у N просветлело, просветленное лицо (подразумевает: эмоционально приподнятое, светлое, радостное).

И наоборот, лицо можно описать по-русски с точки зрения отсутствия света: у N лицо омрачилось, у N лицо помрачнело, у N тень пробежала по лицу, у N лицо погасло, темнеть/потемнеть лицом. Улыбку также можно описать по-русски с точки зрения наличия света (что менее обычно, но не

полностью невозможно по-английски): улыбка освещает лицо. Но следующие словосочетания, совмещающие идею улыбки и плавания или улыбки и ползания, не имеют аналогов в английском языке: лицо у N расплылось в широкой (или радостной) улыбке, у N лицо расплзлось в улыбке. Последние два выражения, описываемые в RECDHB как указывающие на «радостную улыбку» ('joyful smile'), подразумевают своего рода «переполнение» эмоциями, связанное с отсутствием контроля за своим лицом и отсутствием ощущения, что такой контроль необходим.

Плач также обыкновенно описывается по-русски как воздействующий на лицо человека в большей степени, нежели это принято по-английски. Например, в то время как выражение *лицо залито слезами* имеет аналог в выражении *a face flooded with tears*, общепринятое выражение *заплаканное лицо* очевидным образом предполагает большее изменение черт лица какого-либо человека, нежели предполагало бы ближайшее по смыслу английское выражение *tear-stained face*...

Также обращает на себя внимание приводимый в RECDHB длинный список выражений, описывающих лица, не выражающие каких-либо эмоций (часто с какими-то отрицательными импликациями): невыразительное лицо – *unexpressive face*, неподвижное лицо – *immobile face*, деревянное лицо – *wooden face*, каменное лицо – *stone face*, застывшее лицо – *set/frozen face*, у N лицо застыло – *N's face hardened/froze*.

Эти выражения (и их антонимы) предполагают, что «нормальное» лицо должно быть *выразительным, подвижным, живым* и что если лицо не является выразительным, то это само по себе дурной знак (знак трагических переживаний, знак бессердечия и т. д.)...

Обычное разговорное русское словосочетание *выражение лица* в сочетании с прилагательным, обозначающим эмоцию, указывает в том же направлении: в английском языке словосочетание *facial expression* 'выражение лица' является скорее специальным термином, и общеупотребительные русские словосочетания, такие как *радостное*

выражение лица или *веселое выражение лица*, трудно точно передать по-английски... Прилагательные и причастия, описывающие эмоции, по-видимому также менее охотно сочетаются с английским словом *face*, нежели с русским словом *лицо*.

Например:

радостное лицо – joyful face

веселое лицо – merry face

испуганное лицо – frightened face

удивленное лицо – surprised face

злое лицо – angry/mad face

недовольное лицо – displeased face.

Некоторые из таких выражений – например, *sad face* – звучат совершенно естественно и по-английски, но диапазон таких выражений более ограничен. Опять-таки сам собою напрашивается вывод, что русские культурные нормы позволяют и даже поощряют большую выразительность мимики (в сфере эмоций), нежели англосаксонские нормы.....

.....русская культура (в отличие от англосаксонской культуры) содержит общее «предписание», относящееся к эмоциям, которое можно сформулировать следующим образом: хорошо, если другие люди знают, что человек чувствует.

В подтверждение существования такого общего «предписания» можно привести не только такие сочетания, как *здоровый хохот*, но и такое словосочетание, как *душа нараспашку*, имеющее положительные коннотации: импликация состоит в том, что хорошо, даже чудесно, если «душа» (сердце) человека, представляющая собою средоточие эмоциональной жизни, распаивается в стихийном, щедром, широком, бурном порыве, выражая полное доверие к людям и простодушную готовность к общению с ними.

Импlications таких английских слов и выражений, как *emotional* ‘эмоциональный, эмоционально украшенный’, *effusive* ‘экспансивный’, *demonstrative* ‘несдержанный’, *excitable* ‘легко возбудимый’ (отрицательные коннотации), и *dispassionate* ‘бесстрастный’, *calm* ‘спокойный’, *keep calm* ‘сохранять спокойствие’, *keep cool* ‘сохранять невозмутимость, не терять головы’ и *self-control* ‘самообладание’ (положительные коннотации) – совершенно иные.

Если бы у нас были утонченные словари коллокаций, относящихся к человеческому телу, для других языков – например, для итальянского, греческого, малайского, китайского, японского – мы могли бы многое узнать о межкультурных различиях в нормах, относящихся к выражению эмоций... мы могли бы достичь более богатых, и более твердых обобщений.

Text for reading to unit XI.

Текст для чтения к модулю XI

From *“The Influence of Culture on Visual Perception”* by Marshall H. Segall, Donald T. Campbell and Melville J. Herskovits. – Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1966.

The Influence of Culture on Visual Perception

The selections of our collection trace differences in social perception to environmental forces that shape the minds of perceivers. The first selection establishes the impact of visual experience on object perception. It summarizes a large-scale study which demonstrated that gross characteristics of a person's physical environment (such as dense jungles as opposed to flat land) affect the dimensions of the person's perceived space in ways that are measurable with standard laboratory illusions. This fact implies that the assumption of universality in perception is always a risky one.

One noteworthy methodological feature of the study is the fact that the perceptual environment of the persons investigated was carefully inventoried, so that their responses to the laboratory test situation could be systematically related to the world in which they lived.


That human perception is culturally influenced has long been a proposition entertained by many social scientists. The plausibility of this proposition is high, based as it is upon certain contemporary philosophical and social scientific concepts, such as that of cultural relativism. Moreover, many facts gathered in psychological laboratories by students of perception, facts that delineate the important role of an individual's experiences in his subsequent perceptions, enhance the plausibility of this proposition....

But however plausible and however widespread its acceptance, the proposition cannot be considered to be unequivocally demonstrated by very many empirical data. In part because of the largely anecdotal character of the cross-cultural evidence available in the literature and in part because of certain

methodological difficulties inherent in any research on perceptual differences considerably more effort to amass systematic evidence of cultural differences in perception was called for... The result of these considerations was a cooperative data-collection effort in some 15 societies. The stimulus materials employed were based upon five geometric illusions. These materials were chosen primarily because of their relation to a theoretical approach that appears both plausible and testable. Briefly, that approach is empiricist, in that it places emphasis upon the role of learning in visual perception. More specifically, it is based on the Brunswikian notions of ecological cue validity and probabilistic functionalism.

Proceeding within this framework, we predicted that people in different cultures would be differentially susceptible to geometric illusions because they have learned different, but always ecologically valid, visual inference habits. Depending upon the degree of ecological unrepresentativeness of the illusion-inducing figure, these habits may or may not result in illusion susceptibility. Then, applying this general hypothesis to the five illusions, we generated a number of specific, different hypotheses.

The illusions employed in this study were the Müller-Lyer and the Sander parallelogram illusions, two versions of the horizontal-vertical illusion, and an illusion we have termed “perspective drawing.” (An attempt was also made to collect data with the Poggendorf illusion, but procedural difficulties hampered these efforts.) Each of these five illusions was represented by several items in the stimulus materials; and for each illusion, the discrepancy in the length of the segments to be compared varied from item to item. As each item was displayed, the respondent’s task was simply to indicate the longer of two segments. Complete response protocols were collected from 1,878 persons in 14 non-European locations and in the United States. These were collected over a six-year period by a team of fieldworkers in anthropology, psychology, and, in one instance, psychiatry.



Müller-Lyer Illusion Müller-Lyer, F.C. Arch. Anatomie u.Physiol. Physiologische Abt. 2 (Suppl.) 1889, 263 Müller-Lyer, F.C. Z. Psychol. 1896, 9, 1 Day, R.H.; Knuth, H. (transl.) Perception 1981, 10, 126

To minimize difficulties in communication between fieldworkers and respondents, the stimulus materials were designed so that the linear segments to be compared were not connected to each other or to any context segments, and different colors were employed. Respondents could indicate choice either by selecting one of two colors (on the horizontal-vertical items) or by indicating a position, e.g., right or left (on the other illusions). Other steps taken to enhance the validity of the response protocols included the administration of a short comprehension test requiring judgments similar to, but more obvious than, those demanded by the stimulus items. Moreover, an internal-consistency check was later made on each protocol, and wherever irrelevant response sets were detected, those protocols were withheld from one analysis. A comparable analysis was performed with all 1,878 protocols, and the results of both kinds of analysis were substantially identical. After the completion of these analyses, additional data,

including three sets from societies not sampled in our original study, were analyzed, and the results of this analysis substantiated the previous findings.

It was found that on both the Müller-Lyer and the Sander parallelogram illusions the European and American samples made significantly more illusion-supported responses than did the non-Western samples. On the two horizontal-vertical illusions, the European and American samples had relatively low scores, with many, although not all, of the non-Western samples scoring significantly higher. All samples appeared to be minimally susceptible to the perspective drawing — this suggests that it was a weak illusion generally — and no significant intersample differences occurred.

The finding on which we place greatest stress is the bidirectionality of the differences found for the Müller-Lyer and the Sander on the one hand, and the two horizontal-verticals on the other. Cross-cultural comparisons made by Rivers over a halfcentury ago also indicated that non-Western peoples might be less susceptible than Europeans to illusions like the Müller-Lyer and, simultaneously, more susceptible to the horizontal-vertical illusions. Rivers' findings, like those of the present study, thus appear to be in accord with an empiricist, functionalist interpretation that relates visual response habits to cultural and ecological factors in the visual environments.



The “Horizontal-Vertical” illusion

Reprise of the Hypotheses

We will now restate our hypotheses and assess their tenability in the light of what we have learned from all the data we have considered.

For the Müller-Lyer and Sander parallelogram illusions we put forth the “carpentered world” hypothesis and an “experience with two-dimensional representations of reality” hypothesis; both of these hypotheses led to the prediction that Western peoples would prove more susceptible to these illusions than non-Western peoples. We found considerable support for both hypotheses in our own and others’ (e.g., Rivers, Allport and Pettigrew) data. The data on age trends did not support these hypotheses, but we argue that a real test requires data collected from children younger than those thus far studied. We must also acknowledge that in terms of these hypotheses we are unable to explain the precise position occupied by each of our samples along the dimension of illusion susceptibility; but we claim that no other hypothesis we have considered provides a better over-all prediction of these positions. In sum, then, we find the “carpentered world” and “experience with pictures” hypotheses both tenable and promising with respect to future research in perception.

We offered quite another hypothesis as a source for predicting different cultural susceptibilities to the horizontal-vertical illusions. This hypothesis argues that another aspect of the physical environment of peoples — specifically, the presence or absence of broad, horizontal vistas — is crucial in shaping the visual inference habit that leads to horizontal-vertical illusion susceptibility. If one lives in an environment that provides many opportunities for looking at horizontal expanses, one should become subject to the tendency to infer long, frontal-plane, horizontal distances from short, vertical retinal images. This inference habit, we argued, should contribute to the horizontal-vertical illusion. Accordingly, we predicted that plains dwellers would prove maximally susceptible, urban dwellers moderately susceptible, and groups that live in restricted environments (e.g.,

equatorial forests) minimally susceptible to the horizontal-vertical illusion. Again, with just a few qualifications, we found a good fit of our data to this hypothesis.

What is perhaps most encouraging about our findings is the clear-cut demonstration that the cross-cultural differences in our data were not the same for all illusions, and that for each illusion the differences were in accord with our predictions. Accordingly, in spite of certain inadequacies of detail, we feel confident in offering our hypotheses for further consideration. Our data lead us to expect that the findings likely to be uncovered by additional research will prove similar in kind to those reported here and will constitute important amendments to our hypotheses rather than contradictions of them, and that the hypotheses will continue to stand, at least in their general form.

Conclusion

Perception is an aspect of human behavior, and as such it is subject to many of the same influences that shape other aspects of behavior. In particular, each individual's experience combine in a complex fashion to determine his reaction to a given stimulus situation. To the extent that certain classes of experiences are more likely to occur in some cultures than in others, differences in behavior across cultures, including differences in perceptual tendencies, can be great enough even to surpass the everpresent individual differences within cultural groupings.

We have reported here a study that revealed significant differences across cultures in susceptibility to several geometric, or optical, illusions. It should be stressed that these differences are not "racial" differences. They are differences produced by the same kinds of factors that are responsible for individual differences in illusion susceptibility, namely, differences in experience. The findings we have reported, and the findings of others we have reviewed, point to the conclusion that to a substantial extent we learn to perceive; that in spite of the phenomenally, absolute character of our perceptions, they are determined by perceptual inference habits; and that various inference habits are differentially likely in different societies. For all mankind the basic process of perception is the

same; only the contents differ and these differ only because they reflect different perceptual inference habits.

Text for reading to unit X.

Текст для чтения к модулю X

From Plous, S. *The Psychology of Prejudice, Stereotyping and Discrimination: An Overview* / S. Plous // *The psychology of prejudice [Electronic resource]*. – Mode of access : [www. UnderstandingPrejudice.org](http://www.UnderstandingPrejudice.org).

Reducing Stereotypes

As the foregoing review suggests, stereotypes are learned at an early age and can be stubbornly resistant to change. Even when people encounter a stereotyped group member who violates the group stereotype, they often continue to maintain the stereotype by splitting it into subtypes (Judd, Park, & Wolsko, 2001; Kunda & Oleson, 1995; Richards & Hewstone, 2001; Weber & Crocker, 1983). For example, when encountering a Jewish philanthropist, people with anti-Semitic stereotypes may distinguish philanthropic Jews from “money-hungry Jews” by creating a subtype for “good Jews.” As a result of subtyping, stereotypes become impervious to disconfirming evidence. Yet all is not lost. Studies indicate that stereotypes can be successfully reduced and social perceptions made more accurate when people are motivated to do so (Fiske, 2000; Neuberg, 1989; Sinclair & Kunda, 1999). One of the most effective ways to do this is with empathy. Simply by taking the perspective of outgroup members and “looking at the world through their eyes,” ingroup bias and stereotype accessibility can be significantly reduced (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000). Research also suggests that stereotype threat can be lessened with a change in orientation. For instance, one promising experiment found that when African-American college students were encouraged to think of intelligence as malleable rather than fixed, their grades increased and they reported greater enjoyment of the educational process (Aronson, Fried, & Good, 2002). Even implicit stereotypes can be modified (Blair, 2002). In a study on the effects of counter-stereotypic imagery, for example, Irene Blair and her colleagues found that implicit gender stereotypes

declined after people spent a few minutes imagining a strong woman (Blair, Ma, & Lenton, 2001). Likewise, Nilanjana Dasgupta and Anthony Greenwald (2001) found that pro-White biases on the Implicit Association Test declined after people were exposed to pictures of admired Black Americans and disliked White Americans (e.g., Bill Cosby and Timothy McVeigh). Still another study found that implicit and explicit anti-Black biases were reduced after students took a semester-long course on prejudice and conflict (Rudman, Ashmore, & Gary, 2001). As these findings show, stereotypes may be widespread and persistent, but they are also amenable to change when people make an effort to reduce them.

Reducing Prejudice and Discrimination

Research on empathy and role-playing suggests that this type of reversal in perspective can reduce prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination (Batson et al., 1997; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; McGregor, 1993; Stephan & Finlay, 1999). Indeed, empathy training programs appear to reduce prejudice regardless of the age, sex, and race of participants (Aboud & Levy, 2000). In addition, empathy has the practical advantage of being relatively easy to apply in a wide range of situations. To become more empathic toward the targets of prejudice, all one needs to do is to consider questions such as How would I feel in that situation?, How are they feeling right now?, or Why are they behaving that way? Role-playing exercises have also been used to practice responding effectively to prejudiced comments (Plous, 2000). Another powerful method of reducing prejudice and discrimination is to establish laws, regulations, and social norms mandating fair treatment (Oskamp, 2000). In psychology, “norms” are expectations or rules for acceptable behavior in a given situation, and research suggests that even one person’s public support for anti-prejudice norms is enough to move other people in that direction (Blanchard, Lilly, & Vaughn, 1991). Moreover, experiments on antigay and anti-Black prejudice have found that an individual’s support for anti-prejudice norms can sway the opinions of highly prejudiced people as well as those medium or low in prejudice (Monteith,

Deneen, & Tooman, 1996). Normative information is especially potent and enduring when it concerns ingroup members. For example, when White students in one study were told that their fellow students held less racist views than they had thought, this normative information continued to exert a prejudice-lowering effect one week later (Stangor, Sechrist, & Jost, 2001). Even longer-lasting reductions in prejudice are possible when people are made aware of inconsistencies in their values, attitudes, and behaviors. Milton Rokeach (1971) demonstrated, for instance, that when students spent roughly half an hour considering how their values, attitudes, and behaviors were inconsistent with the ideal of social equality, they showed significantly greater support for civil rights more than a year later. These results are consistent with cognitive dissonance theory, which postulates that (1) the act of holding psychologically incompatible thoughts creates a sense of internal discomfort, or dissonance, and (2) people try to avoid or reduce these feelings of dissonance whenever possible (Festinger, 1957). According to this analysis, students in Rokeach's study held incompatible thoughts such as "I support social equality" and "I've never contributed time or money to a civil rights group," and sought to reduce feelings of dissonance by increasing their support for civil rights. Other researchers have used dissonance-related techniques to reduce antigay, anti-Asian, and anti-Black prejudice (Hing, Li, & Zanna, 2002; Leippe & Eisenstadt, 1994; Monteith, 1993). One of the most heavily studied techniques for prejudice reduction is intergroup contact (Hewstone & Brown, 1986). In *The Nature of Prejudice*, Gordon Allport (1954) hypothesized that: Prejudice (unless deeply rooted in the character structure of the individual) may be reduced by equal status contact between majority and minority groups in the pursuit of common goals. The effect is greatly enhanced if this contact is sanctioned by institutional supports (i.e., by law, custom or local atmosphere), and provided it is of a sort that leads to the perception of common interests and common humanity between members of the two groups.

This contention, now widely known as the "contact hypothesis," has received broad research support. In a review of 203 studies from 25 countries –

involving 90,000 participants – Thomas Pettigrew and Linda Tropp (2000) found that 94 % of studies supported the contact hypothesis (that is, 94 % of the time, prejudice diminished as intergroup contact increased).

With this level of support, why hasn't intergroup contact eliminated prejudice from society? The problem with using contact to reduce prejudice is not that the contact hypothesis is wrong, but that it is so difficult to meet the conditions Allport outlined. In many real-world environments the fires of prejudice are fueled by conflict and competition between groups that are unequal in status, such as Israelis and Palestinians, Whites and Blacks, or long-time citizens and recent immigrants (Esses, 1998; Levine & Campbell, 1972). Under conditions of competition and unequal status, contact can even increase prejudice rather than decrease it. For example, in a review of studies conducted during and after school desegregation in U.S., Walter Stephan (1986) found that 46 % of studies reported an increase in prejudice among White students, 17 % report a decline in prejudice, and the remainder reported no change. The key is to craft situations that will lead to cooperative and interdependent interactions in pursuit of common goals, shifting people to recategorize from "us and them" to "we" (Desforges et al., 1991; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1999; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1988). Classroom research has found that cooperative learning techniques increase the self-esteem, morale, and empathy of students across racial and ethnic divisions, and also improve the academic performance of minority students without compromising the performance of majority group students (Aronson & Bridgeman, 1979). One of the earliest of these techniques to be studied, the "jigsaw classroom," divides students into small, racially diverse work groups in which each student is given a vital piece of information about the assigned topic (thereby making each group member indispensable to the others). The jigsaw technique was originally developed specifically to reduce racial prejudice, and decades of research suggest that it is highly effective at promoting positive interracial contact (Aronson & Patnoe, 1997).

Text for reading to unit XI.

Текст для чтения к модулю XI

From *Walker R. S. Protecting isolated tribes / R. Walker, K.R. Hill // Science. - VOL 348 ISSUE 6239. - 2015. Mode of access : <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/277717529>.*

There are about 50 isolated indigenous societies across lowland South America, with limited to no contact with the outside world. Despite displacements, epidemics, and hostile interactions with outsiders, such tribes still manage to survive. How can we ensure the well-being of humanity's last known isolated peoples under such enormous and mounting pressure from external threats? Generally, the current policy of governments, primarily those of Brazil and Peru, and supported by the United Nations, is a "leave them alone" strategy. There are two implicit assumptions in a nocontact approach, however: that isolated populations are viable in the long term, and that they would choose isolation if they had full information (i.e., if they were aware that contact would not lead to massacre and enslavement). The first assumption is unlikely. Ethnohistorical accounts reveal the real risk of severe depopulation or extinction during intermittent hostile and sporadic interaction with the outside world. Miners, loggers, and hunters penetrate into the homelands of isolated tribes despite government "protection." Unless protection efforts against external threats and accidental encounters are drastically increased, the chances that these tribes will survive are slim. Disease epidemics, compounded by demographic variability and inbreeding effects, makes the disappearance of small, isolated groups very probable in the near future. The second assumption is also unlikely. Interviews indicate that contacted groups had mainly chosen isolation out of fear of being killed or enslaved, but they also wanted outside goods and innovations and positive social interactions with neighbors. Controlled contact with isolated peoples is a better option than a no-contact policy. This means that governments

should initiate contact only after conceiving a well-organized plan. In the past, there have been many poorly planned contacts with isolated Amazonian tribes by both missionaries and government agencies. The absence of health care professionals and health monitoring led to many deaths of these vulnerable peoples. One of us (K.R.H.) was on site within weeks of the first peaceful contacts with Aché, Yora, Mascho-Piro, and Matsiguenga communities in Paraguay and Peru when they were extremely isolated and suffering from new contact-related epidemics (from the late 1970s to mid-1980s), even though intermittent contact (mostly accidental) had occurred for 25 years. The most important lesson learned from these experiences is that mortality can be reduced to near zero if the contact team is prepared to provide sustained, around-the-clock medical treatment, as well as food. A well-designed contact can be quite safe, compared to the disastrous outcomes from accidental contacts. But safe contact requires a qualified team of cultural translators and health care professionals that is committed to staying on site for more than a year. For example, foreign missionaries provided great care for the Yora for up to 6 months, but when they decided to take a furlough, dozens of Yora died within a few weeks. Similarly, in 1975, missionaries provided care to an Aché community for a year, but when they took a vacation, many Aché died. Fortunately, there have been some success stories such as a 1978 contact with a band of Northern Aché. Missionaries and anthropologists treated them with antibiotics when primary respiratory infections progressed to pneumonia. They also provided food to the sick. Given that isolated populations are not viable in the long term, well-organized contacts are today both humane and ethical. We know that soon after peaceful contact with the outside world, surviving indigenous populations rebound quickly from population crashes, with growth rates over 3 % per year. Once a sustained peaceful contact occurs, it becomes much easier to protect native rights than it otherwise would be for isolated populations. Leaving groups isolated, yet still exposed to dangerous and uncontrolled interactions with the outside world, is a violation of governmental responsibility. By refusing authorized, well-planned contacts,

governments are simply guaranteeing that accidental and disastrous contacts will take place instead.

Text for reading to unit XII.

Текст для чтения к модулю XII

From *Bhawuk D. P. S. Cross-cultural training: a review / D.P.S. Bhawuk, R. W. Brislin // Applied psychology. – Jan. 2000. – 49 (1). – pp.162-191 [Electronic resource]. – Mode of access : https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227713131_Cross-cultural_Training_A_Review. – Date of access : 09.07.19.*

Programs designed for preparing people for living in another culture are usually referred to as “Cross-Cultural or Intercultural Orientation Programs.” It seems that the early practitioners and researchers viewed preparing people for international assignment as a process in which one needed to be oriented to the differences in social interactions between the two cultures. However, researchers and practitioners alike are realizing that we need to do more than orient people to prepare them to live abroad (e.g., we must introduce and practice culturally appropriate behaviors), and the field is being referred to as Cross-Cultural or Intercultural Training by more and more people.

Paige (1986) defined cross-cultural orientation as training programs designed to prepare people to live and carry out specific assignments as well as those that are designed to prepare people to return to their home country after completing their assignment in another culture. Brislin and Yoshida (1993) define cross-cultural training as formal efforts to prepare people for more effective interpersonal relations and for job success when they interact extensively with individuals from cultures other than their own (Brislin & Yoshida, 1993). Features of programs are that they are formal rather than the set of informal and unplanned behaviors that everyone undertakes when they live in another country, well-planned, budgeted, and staffed by experts who are knowledgeable about the wide range of issues people face when they live in other cultures. In addition, the scope of cross-cultural training has been expanded over the years to not only

preparing people for reentry but also preparing people within one's own country to deal with people who are from another culture (Bhawuk & Triandis, 1996a; Brislin & Horvath, 1997).

Harrison and Hopkins (1967) also made significant impact on the field in the sixties. They evaluated training programs that used the lecture method to prepare people for living abroad. They found that the lecture method was, at that time, the most pervasive method or approach to cross-cultural training, and one that was used without much reservation. They recommended that the experiential method was superior to the lecture method. This led to a growth in the development of experiential exercises as well as the culture assimilator, which will be discussed at length below. They gave five reasons why the University Model or the lecture method in which a trainer lectures to a group of trainees about the target culture, usually its history, geography, religion, people, business, way of life, and so forth, was not effective in cross-cultural training programs. First, the university model assumes passive rather than active learning. In lecture method, the trainees are provided information in a package, almost in a canned fashion (i.e., open the can and the information is there for use), by the expert, whereas, in real life the onus of information collection lies on the trainee or sojourner. Second, this method traditionally involves trainees in problem solving types of activities, where well-defined problems are provided by the instructor. In real life, however, the sojourners have to identify the problem by themselves before they can attempt to address it. Third, in the class room people are encouraged to be rational and unemotional; whereas in real life the sojourners have to confront situations that are charged with emotion, and they need to develop "the emotional muscle", which is needed in intercultural interactions. Fourth, the university model usually requires participants to study material and produce an analytical report, what Trifonovitch (1977) called a "paper orientation," whereas, in intercultural interaction people need skills to interact with people, or a "people orientation." Finally, this method focuses on written more so than the verbal communication, whereas, the major mode of

communication for sojourners is oral and nonverbal. Thus, Harrison and Hopkins (1967) do make a strong case against the classroom method that follows the traditional teaching approach. Despite the criticism, there are many reasons for the university method to still be popular. This is a method to which most people have exposure, and is simple, flexible, and inexpensive. Also, trainers can use video films, slides, and other visual aids to show cultural differences. However, as mentioned earlier the article by Harrison and Hopkins (1967) provided a major stimulation to the development of the experiential method of cross-cultural training, thus contributing to methodological innovation in the field.

The culture assimilator is the contribution of the psychologists from University of Illinois (Triandis, 1995a). It is a cross-cultural training tool that consists of a number of real-life scenarios describing puzzling cross-cultural interactions and explanation for avoiding the emerging misunderstandings. These scenarios or vignettes are called critical incidents (Flanagan, 1954). These critical incidents describe intercultural interactions between a sojourner and a host country national that depict a misunderstanding because of cultural differences between the two people. At the end of the critical incident a question is posed that asks the reader to reflect on the scenario and think about the source of misunderstanding. The question is followed by four or five alternatives that are plausible behavioral choices for a person facing such a social situation. In effect, the reader is asked to make attributions and then to compare his or her attributions with the ones provided at the end of the incident. One of these alternatives represents a view from one of the two cultures involved in the situation and a second one captures the views of the second culture. The rest of the alternatives try to capture a range of individual differences present in either of the cultures, but are usually less appropriate or desirable. Thus, one would be behaving correctly in his or her own culture if he or she selected one particular alternative, but another alternative would have to be selected for the person to behave appropriately in the second culture. For each of the alternatives, an explanation is offered, usually on a separate page. The explanation gives the rationale why a

particular behavior (alternative) is not appropriate in the given situation. Hence, the culture assimilator consists of a number of critical incidents that have three parts: An incident or a short story, four or five alternative behavioral choices or attributions, and explanations or feedback about why an alternative is to be preferred or not. Culture assimilators are one of the earliest structured training materials, which fall in the broad category of Programmed Instruction. Trainees are given the package of training material that consists of a number of incidents, alternatives, and explanations to study at their own pace. This makes the assimilator a convenient self-learning tool. Since different people are at different levels of cultural sensitivity, this method is particularly useful as a cross-cultural training tool.

Another early innovation in cross-cultural training was the culture self-awareness method in which trainees see the demonstration of a behavior that is completely opposite to one in their own culture. Stewart (1966) used this approach to train Americans going abroad and called it the Contrast-American technique. In his programs, he used a model to demonstrate a behavior that was completely opposed to the American way of doing something. The trainees interacted with the model and the session was videotaped. Following this session, the trainer debriefed the trainees. This method is valuable in developing cultural self-awareness, and one of the strengths of the method is that it emphasizes affective goals through experiential processes. This type of training works in three steps: it helps the trainees to recognize their own cultural values, who then analyze the contrasts with other cultures, and then finally apply the insight to intercultural interaction (Bennett, 1986a). An obvious weakness of the method is that it does not necessarily help the trainees to learn anything specific about the host culture(s) in which they will be interacting... Thus, in the fifties and sixties the foundation of cross-cultural training was laid, and some of the constructs that we take for granted were developed during this time. The research on culture assimilators and the development of simulations extended into the next decades.

Experiential exercises emerged as a reaction to the traditional university model, and as a result they focus on involving the trainees a great deal. The most popular type of experiential tool is the simulation game in which trainees interact with other people following a set of guidelines provided by the trainer. Usually, trainees are divided into two groups and each represent an imaginary culture with some simple rules. Two popular simulations are BAFA BAFA (Shirts, 1973), and the Albatross (Gochenour, 1977). ...Another experiential approach is the area simulation in which the target culture is simulated, usually in a natural setting. For example, Hawaii provides the natural setting for simulating life in the Pacific Islands. Trifonovitch (1977) used Hawaii for training Americans who were going to Pacific Islands to emphasize the difference between “land culture” and “sea culture,” and required the trainees to support themselves by taking care of their food, water, waste disposal, entertainment, and other needs. Among other things, this training provided the opportunity to weaken habitual behaviors such as using clocks and to inculcate new behaviors like using the sun, tide, and the wind direction to think about the time of the day. The strengths of this method are that trainees learn skills that are necessary for living in the target culture on their own, with minimal guidance from the training staff, and doing is stressed over thinking or intellectualizing (Trifonovitch, 1977).

Kraemer’s cultural self-awareness model is a training method that was developed in the seventies, and is based on the assumption that one knows one’s culture so well that one really does not think about it, and one needs to be reminded about the assumptions of one’s culture. The training program consists of a set of videotapes that contain 138 episodes covering 21 themes (Kraemer, 1973, 1974). Professional actors play the roles of hosts and sojourners (Americans). The trainees watch the videotape and generate themes for the episodes. Later they compare these themes with those provided by the trainer. A group discussion and a debriefing session follow to clarify any questions or doubts. This method was quite advanced for its time since it used a new technology, i.e., videotapes, and was also sophisticated theoretically since it used the principles of Social Learning

Theory (Bandura, 1977). Bennett (1985) tested the effectiveness of this method by using a sample of exchange students, and found that the treatment group that received this training performed better than the control group.

The field of cross-cultural training showed signs of maturity in the eighties through the publication of theoretical books, handbooks, special issues in journals, and the development of a culture general assimilator that used a broad theoretical typology, all of which led to the integration and systematization of the field.

The development of the culture general assimilator (Brislin, Cushner, Cherrie, & Yong, 1986) was a significant contribution to the field in that it directed research in cross-cultural training away from the less theoretical realm of culture specific assimilators (Brislin & Bhawuk, 1999). It covers eighteen themes that have appeared in the literature as important concepts in the context of living abroad. These themes are organized around three broad headings: People's Intense Feelings, Knowledge Areas, and Bases of Cultural Differences (Brislin et al., 1986). The culture-general assimilator consists of 100 critical incidents that cover all the above themes. In a number of studies, researchers have found support for the effectiveness of the culture-general assimilator

In the 1990s, researchers have focused on evaluating cross-cultural training programs using methods like meta-analysis, building theoretically meaningful models and training materials, and developing criterion measures that can be used in the evaluation of various training programs. Cross-Cultural Training Evaluation Researchers have paid some attention to evaluation of cross-cultural training programs. ...One of the recent developments is the attention given to behavior modification training. Behavior modification is based on the Social Learning Theory (SLT) proposed by Bandura (1977). It has four central elements: Attention, Retention, Reproduction, and Incentive. According to SLT, people need to observe a behavior before learning it (i.e., they need to pay attention to the target behavior). Attention is a function of status, attractiveness, similarity, and availability of past reinforcement for focusing on the model demonstrating the

target behavior. Retention refers to how people remember behaviors, and the theory proposes that behaviors are remembered either as imaginal cognitive maps or as verbally encoded units. Retention is a function of practice or repetition. Reproduction refers to the demonstration of the learned behavior by the learner, and the theory posits that people translate remembered symbols into action by checking the results against memory. Incentives refer to external (valence of outcomes) and internal (satisfaction, self-efficacy) motivators that help people to observe, retain, and reproduce learned behaviors. The essence of SLT is that learning is affected by both observation and experience, and that people anticipate actions and their associated consequences (Bandura, 1977). Behavior modification training is necessary for habitual behaviors that people are not usually aware of, especially behaviors that are acceptable, even desirable, in one's own culture but which may be offensive in another culture. For example, in Latin American cultures, people give an abrazo or an embrace to friends which is not an acceptable behavior in the United States; or in Greece when people show an open palm, called moutza, they are showing utmost contempt, and not simply waving or saying hello (Triandis, 1994). A moutza needs to be avoided, whereas, an abrazo needs to be acquired. There are many examples of such behaviors, and the only way to learn them is through behavior modeling, by observing a model do the behavior and then practicing the behavior many times. Despite its theoretical rigor and practical significance, this method has not been used much in cross-cultural training programs because it is expensive, requiring a trainer who constantly works on one behavior at a time. Harrison (1992) examined the effectiveness of different types of training programs by comparing groups that received culture assimilator training (i.e., Japanese Culture Assimilator), behavioral modeling training, a combined training (i.e., behavioral modeling and culture assimilator), and no training (i.e., control group). He found that people who received the combined training scored significantly higher on a measure of learning than those who were given other types of training or no training. This group performed better on the role-play task compared to the control group only,

but not to the other two groups. This study provides further evidence for the impact of assimilators on behavioral tasks.

...The development of the field of cross-cultural training over the past fifty years shows an encouraging sign of evolution of more theoretically meaningful training methods and tools. It can be expected that more theory-based training methods and material are likely to be developed in the future. More theory-based culture assimilators like the Individualism and Collectivism Assimilator, theory-based exercises and simulations (Brislin & Yoshida, 1994; Cushner & Brislin, 1997), and behavior modeling type of programs (Harrison, 1992) based on social learning theory are likely to emerge. Culture assimilators are also likely to remain the most popular method as this tool has evolved from culture specific to culture general to culture theory-based format (Bhawuk, 1999, 1996), and many computer-based and multimedia assimilators (Bhawuk et al., 1999) are likely to emerge in future. Thus, there will be an increased demand for newer and more sophisticated training tools, challenging both research and practice, and the experiential exercises are likely to become more complex, and would probably use more than one medium (e.g., audio, visual, discourse, models, and so forth).

Text for reading to unit XIII.
Текст для чтения к модулю XIII

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Face

The question of human psychological identity is a complex issue that goes beyond the study of communication into psychology, sociology, and philosophy. Nevertheless, there is an important aspect of identity that has been recognized as an essential element in all communication. In chapter 2 we said that there were two aspects of participation which are important to consider: who the participants are and what roles they are taking. At that time we were referring mostly to the places that participants occupy in an institutional or a social structure on the one hand, and on the other hand, the particular position they were taking in some speech event. Now we want to take up a third and more deeply personal aspect of this component of participation: the interpersonal identity of the individuals in communication. The concept of face is not new to Asian readers, who will recognize the term *mianzi* in Mandarin (*minji* in Cantonese, *mentsu* in Japanese, *chae myon* in Korean), where it carries a range of meanings based upon a core concept of “honor,” but perhaps the way it is used in contemporary sociolinguistics and sociology will be somewhat different. The concept first was introduced by the Chinese anthropologist Hu in 1944, though the term had been used in English for at least several centuries before that. The American sociologist Erving Goffman based much of his work on interpersonal relationships on the concept of face. One of the most important ways in which we reduce the ambiguity of communication is by making assumptions about the people we are talking to. As the simplest example, when we begin talking to someone we try to speak to them in a language we know they will understand. In a monolingual speech community that is rarely a problem, but in the increasingly multilingual

international business community it is becoming a major issue, to be solved right at the outset of communications. We also make significant assumptions about what kind of a person the other person is and what kind of a person he or she would like us to think of him or her as being. When Mr Hutchins called his subordinate colleague by his first name, Bill, he projected the assumption that there was a difference in status between them and he also projected that they both would agree to that difference in status by simply using the name Bill without further comment. Bill, in turn, projected that he accepted that difference in status and ratified that by calling his employer Mr Hutchins. Many aspects of linguistic form depend on the speakers making some analysis of the relationships among themselves. The choice of terms of address is one of the first of these recognized by sociolinguists. The watch vendor in Tsim Sha Tsui also recognized that different forms of address, "Eh!" or "Sir!," were appropriate in trying to catch the attention of two different potential customers. The study of face in sociolinguistics arose out of the need to understand how participants decide what their relative statuses are and what language they use to encode their assumptions about such differences in status, as well as their assumptions about the face being presented by participants in communication. Within sociological and sociolinguistic studies face is usually given the following general definition: "Face is the negotiated public image, mutually granted each other by participants in a communicative event." In this definition and in the work of sociolinguists the emphasis is not so much on shared assumptions as it is on the negotiation of face. For our purposes we want to keep both aspects of face in mind. We believe that while there is much negotiation of face in any form of interpersonal communication, participants must also make assumptions about face before they can begin any communication. We do not have to figure out everything from the beginning every time we talk to someone. Mr Hutchins and Bill do not need to open up negotiations about their relationship each time they speak to each other. Just the fact that Mr Hutchins is Bill's employer is sufficient information to know that they differ in status. Knowing that difference in status and how it is normally

expressed in English, we can predict fairly accurately that Bill will say “Mr Hutchins,” and Mr Hutchins will say “Bill.” Participants make certain unmarked assumptions about their relationships and about the face they want to claim for themselves and are willing to give to the other participants in any communicative situation. In addition to these unmarked assumptions, participants also undertake a certain amount of negotiation of their relationships as a natural process of change in human relationships. For example, if a person wants to ask a rather large favor of another person, he or she is likely to begin with the assumed relationship, but then he or she will begin to negotiate a closer or more intimate relationship. If such a closeness is achieved then he or she is likely to feel it is safer to risk asking for the favor than if their negotiations result in more distance between them. In the field of sociolinguistics this combination of unmarked assumptions about the participants and their relationships with the negotiations about those assumptions is called the study of face. Such study also goes by the name of politeness theory.

The “Self” as a Communicative Identity

One reason the term “face” is attractive in communicative studies is that it leaves open the question of who is the “real” person underneath the face which is presented in communication. That deeper question is ultimately a question of psychology or, perhaps, philosophy, and we will not go further into it. Nevertheless, it is important to point out now that there may be significant cultural differences in the assumptions made about the “self” that is involved in communication. The idea of “self” which underlies western studies of communication is highly individualistic, self-motivated, and open to ongoing negotiation. We believe that this concept of the “self” is not entirely appropriate as the basis for Asian communication. There is reason to believe that the “self” projected by Asians is a more collectivistic “self,” one which is more connected to membership in basic groups such as the family or one’s working group and which is taken to be more strongly under the influence of assumed or unmarked cultural assumptions about face.

The Paradox of Face: Involvement and Independence

Face is really a paradoxical concept. By this we mean that there are two sides to it which appear to be in contrast. On the one hand, in human interactions we have a need to be involved with other participants and to show them our involvement. On the other hand, we need to maintain some degree of independence from other participants and to show them that we respect their independence. These two sides of face, involvement and independence, produce an inherently paradoxical situation in all communications, in that both aspects of face must be projected simultaneously in any communication. The involvement aspect of face is concerned with the person's right and need to be considered a normal, contributing, or supporting member of society. This involvement is shown through being a normal and contributing participant in communicative events. One shows involvement by taking the point of view of other participants, by supporting them in the views they take, and by any other means that demonstrates that the speaker wishes to uphold a commonly created view of the world. Involvement is shown by such discourse strategies as paying attention to others, showing a strong interest in their affairs, pointing out common ingroup membership or points of view with them, or using first names. As we will indicate below, we might say such things as, "Are you feeling well today?," or, "I know just what you mean, the same thing happened to me yesterday," or, "Yes, I agree, I've always believed that, too." Any indication that the speaker is asserting that he or she is closely connected to the hearer may be considered a strategy of involvement. Many other terms have been used in the sociolinguistic literature to present this concept. It has been called positive face, for example, on the basis of the idea of the positive and negative poles of magnetism. The positive poles of a magnet attract, and by analogy involvement has been said to be the aspect of communication in which two or more participants show their common attraction to each other. Involvement has also been called solidarity politeness; again, for the reason that sociolinguists want to emphasize that this aspect of face shows what participants have in common. Any of these terms might be acceptable in

some contexts, but we feel that the term “involvement” is clearest and creates the fewest analytical complications for the reader. The independence aspect of face emphasizes the individuality of the participants. It emphasizes their right not to be completely dominated by group or social values, and to be free from the impositions of others. Independence shows that a person may act with some degree of autonomy and that he or she respects the rights of others to their own autonomy and freedom of movement or choice. Independence is shown by such discourse strategies as making minimal assumptions about the needs or interests of others, by not “putting words into their mouths,” by giving others the widest range of options, or by using more formal names and titles. For example, in ordering in a restaurant we might say, “I don’t know if you will want to have rice or noodles,” or in making the initial suggestion to go out for coffee we might say, “I’d enjoy going out for coffee, but I imagine you are very busy.” The key to independence face strategies is that they give or grant independence to the hearer. Independence has also been given various other names by researchers in sociolinguistics. It has been called negative politeness, as an analogy with the negative pole of a magnet, which repels. We prefer not to use this term, because technical or formal contrast between “positive” and “negative” can easily be forgotten and readers can too easily begin to think of “positive politeness” as good and “negative politeness” as bad. Another term which has been used as an attempt to get around the potential negative aspects of “positive” and “negative” politeness has been “deference politeness.” We have used “solidarity” and “deference” in earlier writings, but find that some readers have a strong preference for one type of strategy or the other and, again, miss the point that both aspects of face must be projected simultaneously in any communication. The most important concept to remember about face is that it is paradoxical. By that we mean the concept of face has built into it both aspects; involvement and independence must be projected simultaneously in any communication. It is always a matter of more or less, not absolute expression of just one or the other. A speaker must find just the right way of saying something which shows the degree

to which he or she is involving the other participants and the degree to which he or she is granting independence to them. The reason involvement and independence are in conflict is that emphasizing one of them risks a threat to the other. If I show you too much involvement, you are likely to feel that your independence is being threatened. On the other hand if I grant you too much independence, you are likely to feel that I have limited your involvement. Any communication is a risk to face; it is a risk to one's own face at the same time it is a risk to the other person's. We have to carefully project a face for ourselves and to respect the face rights and claims of other participants. We risk our own involvement face if we do not include other participants in our relationship. That is, if we exclude others, while that may increase our own independence, it at the same time decreases our own involvement. At the same time, if we include others, we risk our own independence face. Looking at it from the other person's point of view, if we give too much involvement to the other person, we risk their independence face. On the other hand if we give them too much independence, we risk their involvement. The result of the double risk, the risk to involvement face and the risk to independence face of both the speaker and the hearer, means, therefore, that all communication has to be carefully phrased to respect face, both involvement face and independence face. This could be said another way: "There is no faceless communication."

Politeness Strategies of Involvement and Independence

Now that we have given you a general introduction to the concept of face in interpersonal communication, we hope that we can make this discussion clearer by giving a number of examples of actual linguistic strategies which are used to communicate these different face strategies. The most extreme contrast between involvement and independence is the difference between speaking (or communicating) and silence (or noncommunication). Any form of communication at all is somewhat on the side of involvement. In order to communicate at all, the participants must share some aspects of symbolic systems which they can

interpret in shared ways. If I speak to you and you are able to answer me, we have already shared some small degree of involvement. As a result we would classify speech on the side of involvement, and silence (or better still, non-communication) on the side of independence. Perhaps it is important to clarify that there are silences which can be interpreted as high involvement as well. We know that two people who share a very intimate situation can communicate to each other a high degree of involvement while remaining completely silent. That is why we have rephrased “silence” as “non-communication” above. It is the silence of noncommunication to which we refer when we say it is at the independence end of the continuum. One grants (and claims for oneself) the highest level of independence by having no communication with the other. Taciturnity and volubility are somewhat lesser extremes of noncommunication and communication. Taciturnity means, simply, not talking very much. Volubility is the other side of the coin, “talking a lot.” Both of these are highly relative terms. There is no absolute amount of speech which can be classed as taciturn or as voluble. The same is true for individuals; there are no absolutely taciturn or voluble individuals. Likewise there are no absolutely taciturn or voluble groups, or societies, or cultures. Nevertheless, one aspect of the grammar of context is expectations of the amount of speech. For example, many religious rites or ceremonies are very restricted in the amount of incidental conversational or non-formal speech expected. In such a situation, a person who was speaking at all might be perceived as being very voluble. On the other hand, at a friendly dinner party among close friends, a person who was speaking, but not to any great extent, might be considered to be taciturn, because the expectations are for a good bit of conversational exchange. Psychological studies of conversational exchanges and formal interviews have shown that the more talk there is, the more these exchanges are perceived as “warm” or “affiliative.” In contrast, the less talk there is, the more they are perceived as “cold” or “non-affiliative.” On the basis of this designation of “affiliative,” we believe that it is best to consider more talk, volubility, to be an involvement strategy, and less talk, taciturnity, to be an

independence strategy. From the point of view of face relationships, we have said above that any communication is based on sharing a symbolic system, and that such a sharing is already to some degree an expression of involvement. Therefore, the question of what language to use is a crucial one in international business and government relationships as well as within bilingual or multilingual speech communities. If negotiations are conducted among participants using different languages (but, of course, with translators), this is a situation of lesser involvement or of higher independence than if negotiations are conducted using the same language. Therefore, it is a question of face relationships to decide whether discussions should go on in separate languages mediated by translators or whether they should go on in a common language. Naturally, of course, if the negotiations go on in the native language of one of the participants (or group of participants) that will tip the balance of involvement toward their side. It will give the other participants a sense of having their own independence limited, perhaps even unduly. At the same time, an insistence on the use of separate languages to overcome this problem can produce a sense of too great an independence, which can be felt as hostility or unwillingness to come to a common ground of agreement. The choice of language in discourse is not simply a matter of practical choice governed by efficiency of communication of information. Every such choice is also a matter of the negotiation of the face of the participants.

...If a university professor named Dr Wong from Hong Kong meets a university professor from Tokyo named Dr Hamada, they are likely to refer to each other as “Professor Wong” and “Professor Hamada.” In such a system they would treat each other as equals and use a relatively high concentration of independence politeness strategies out of respect for each other and for their academic positions. Such a system of mutual but distant independence is what we mean by a deference politeness system. A deference politeness system is one in which participants are considered to be equals or near equals but treat each other at a distance. Relationships among professional colleagues who do not know each other well is one example.

One could find solidarity politeness anywhere the system is egalitarian and participants feel or express closeness to each other. Friendships among close colleagues are often solidarity systems. For example, Professor Wong, who calls Professor Hamada “Professor” or “Doctor,” might call a colleague in his own department with whom he works every day by some much more familiar name. Those familiar with North American business will recognize this pattern as one Americans adopt very quickly in business relationships, especially in sales and marketing.

Solidarity politeness system is the recognized difference in status. It may be of much less significance whether or not there is distance between the participants. In such a face system the relationships are asymmetrical. By that we mean that the participants do not use the same face politeness strategies in speaking to each other. The person in the superordinate or upper position uses involvement strategies in speaking “down.” The person in the subordinate or lower position uses independence strategies in speaking “up.” Calling someone by his or her surname and title (Mr Hutchins) is an independence strategy. Calling someone by his or her given name without a title (Bill) is an involvement strategy. This sort of hierarchical face system is quite familiar in business, governmental, and educational organizations. In fact, it could be said to be the most common sort of organizational relationship, as indicated in tables of organization.

We are most concerned that the reader understand the main properties of these three systems of face. Two of them are symmetrical: the deference system and the solidarity system. One of them is asymmetrical: the hierarchical system. In the first, all participants use on balance a greater proportion of independence face strategies. In the second, all participants use on balance a greater proportion of involvement face strategies. In the hierarchical face system, however, because it is asymmetrical, the participants use different face strategies; involvement strategies are used “downward” and independence strategies are used “upward.”

Miscommunication

We have a friend who in learning Spanish could never get right the differences between the familiar set of pronouns and the formal set of pronouns. He found it difficult to remember when he should say, “Usted” (“you” formally), and when he should say, “Tu” (“you” informally). He simplified the whole system by just insisting on using the T-forms. This, of course, presented a major problem for Spanish speakers in Mexico, where he was living at that time. As a foreigner he was expected to use the formal terms, the “Usted” forms of politeness. In other words, he was expected to use independence strategies of politeness. But he was not using them; he was using the T-forms, the involvement forms. In Mexican social terms there were only two contexts in which he could use the involvement forms: either if he was a very good friend or if he was trying to pick a fight (that is, if it was an attempt to assert power over the other). In other words, the solidarity system is used only among intimates. Remember that when one participant uses involvement face strategies and the other uses independence strategies, the one using the involvement strategies is the higher of the two. When someone addresses you as Mr Schneider and you answer back, “Juan,” whatever your intentions might be, what he hears is the same thing we read above between Mr Hutchins and Bill: we hear one person taking a higher position over the other. In the interpersonal world of Mexican conversations this sounded like trying to put someone down or to insult him or her by taking a superior position. Our friend had thus presented our Mexican friends with a problem. Within their cultural interpretation of these face strategies, they expected a deference politeness system. When he used an involvement strategy, they had only two choices: (1) they could hear it as an insult, or (2) they could hear it as an expression of close and longstanding friendship. It should be noted that within that segment of Mexican society, at least at that time, it was quite normal for people to be relatively good friends for quite a few years before moving on to the stage of using the familiar pronouns or other involvement strategies. Those were reserved for close and old friends. It is not surprising that our friend ran into both solutions

to this problem. Many people befriended him, taking into consideration that his poor ability with the language was the cause of his misuse of pronouns and understanding that he only intended to show warmth and friendship. On the other hand, from time to time someone he did not know well took offense, and more than once he found himself with bruises as the result. The point we wish to make with this anecdote is that miscommunication often arises, especially across the boundaries of discourses or discourse systems, because it is difficult to know in a new group, in a new language, or in a new culture how to express these rather subtle differences in face values. This analysis of face also tells us what sort of miscommunication arises. We can state it as a general rule: "When two participants differ in their assessment of face strategies, it will tend to be perceived as difference in power." If I think it is a solidarity system, and you use independence strategies, it sounds to me like you are putting yourself in a lower position and giving power over to me. If I use independence strategies, I expect to hear reciprocal independence strategies (if I think it is a deference system and we have a level of mutual respect). But if you use involvement strategies back, what I hear is that you are trying to exert power over me. To put it in the terms of our dialogue between Mr Hutchins and Bill, if Bill answers back to Mr Hutchins, "Sure, Jack, I can have it ready," we are certain that Mr Hutchins will feel that something has gone wrong. And it is not just "something" that has gone wrong. He will feel that Bill is being insulting, trying to rise above his position, trying to usurp authority, or in some way trying to deny the authority structure.

We said earlier that there is no faceless communication. Now we would like to add to that there is no non-hierarchical communication. That is because any difference in sense of hierarchy gives rise to difficulties in selecting face strategies, and any miscalculation in face strategies gives rise to feelings of power differences.