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AD HOC RULES: THE GRAMMAR BEHIND THE GRAMMAR

When alternative variants for a particular grammatical construction or morphosyntactic category are observed in a language, the grammatical literature usually describes them in terms of two coexisting rules that stand in competition, or in a certain kind of division of labour. There is an alternative to such a traditional view, which is rarely ever explored, namely, the *absence* of a particular rule. This idea hardly fits into the current mainstream of grammatical thinking, with its strong focus on cognitivist modeling and synchrony. From that point of view it seems perhaps impossible by necessity that speakers could utter linguistic expressions without having a rule for them at their disposal.

In my presentation, I will show that there are good reasons to assume such a possibility. I will first motivate it with reference to the evolutionary theory of the language change the roots of which can be traced back to Saussure, as Thibault (1997) showed, and which has been outlined in some detail in the work of Rudi Keller (e.g. his 1993 monograph), a.o.

I will then discuss three phenomena from German morphosyntax that are, for various reasons, prototypical candidates for speaking regularly without there being a particular conventionalised rule. In discussing these phenomena, I will also identify factors that determine the regularity of their occurrence, factors that constitute, so to speak, a grammar of general principles behind the particular language system.

Starting point for my discussion is Saussure's distinction between *langue* (language system) and *parole* (speech) as two distinct phenomenological domains of language which, as Thibault (1997) emphasises in contrast to much of the previous Saussure reception, are conceived to stand in a tight dialectical relationship of independence and interdependence. This relationship is at the heart of language change. Whereas *parole* is the domain of real speech events as they can be observed in everyday communicative practice and be collected fragmentarily in linguistic corpora, *langue* is the collection of linguistic *conventions* that have emerged historically through the communicative practices in the speech community. These conventions are no less real than the speech events of *parole*. It is this social nature of grammar that has been emphasised by Saussure, and whose implications for grammatical theory are widely ignored, if not dismissed, under the cognitivist dogma that still dominates the field.

According to the evolutionary view, linguistic change starts in parole. A new form or meaning first occurs in single speech events, then become regularised in the communicative practices of the community and, by these means, also conventionalised as part of langue. A crucial precondition for this is a certain frequency of occurrence. As Rudi Keller put it, the rules of the language system are standard solutions to recurrent communicative problems. (Keller 2009)

But what happens with communicative problems that are occurring only very rarely? According to the evolutionary model, their solutions will not have a chance to become conventionalised. Those solutions might still display some regularity, but it will be motivated by extragrammatical means. I will call such regular solutions for rarely occurring communicative problems *ad hoc rules*.

For the researcher, the questions that are most important are i) whether we can distinguish ad hoc rules from the rules of langue *by empirical means*, and ii) which extragrammatical factors explain their regularity, to the extent that there is some. From my own work on the grammar of German, I can identify three phenomena that are candidates of such ad hoc rules: a) reflexive ditransitive verbs where the two objects are coreferential; b) infinitival verbal complexes of a modal and a lexical verb in perfect tense; c) case conflicts in free relative constructions serving as objects of a verb.

Each of these phenomena is extremely rare even in larger corpora of German. Even more so, the rare instances to be found display interesting divergences from established rules of German grammar. In acceptability studies on these phenomena, we find larger variance among speakers than for other syntactic phenomena. Extra-grammatical factors that can be identified in motivating these ad hoc rules are pragmatic factors, in the spirit of Levinson's (2000) neo Gricean theory of conversational implicature, the meta-grammatical concepts of markedness and iconicity, as well as frequency-based scales of grammatical units.

These findings together provide substantial arguments in support of our proposal of ad hoc rules as a particular aspect of grammar in usage.

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ВАРИАТИВНОСТЬ СПОСОБОВ ВЫРАЖЕНИЯ НЕСОГЛАСИЯ ПРИ ПОМОЩИ ИНТЕРПРЕТИРУЮЩИХ РЕЧЕВЫХ АКТОВ В НАУЧНОМ ДИСКУРСЕ

В силу своего полемического характера устный научный диалог располагает широкой палитрой способов выражения несогласия. К числу таких способов относится использование речевых действий, направленных на уточнение правильности понимания сообщения адресатом, которые впервые были выделены И. М. Кобозевой и Н. И. Лауфер и названы ими «интерпретирующие речевые акты» [1].

В роли интерпретирующих речевых актов (далее – ИРА) выступают реплики реактивного характера, содержащие исходную интерпретируемую пропозицию (или ее часть), причем эта исходная пропозиция всегда подвергается в ИРА определенной модификации (соответственно в класс ИРА ввиду отсутствия интерпретативного компонента не включаются, например, цитаты и переспросы). Характерными чертами ИРА являются: а) самостоятельное изложение, не повторяющее слова собеседника дословно; б) наличие интерпретации при возможности частичного изменения содержания, в) наличие специфического языкового маркера (*то есть, значит, получается, вы исходите из, вы думаете/ считаете/ подразумеваете, из ваших слов следует, вы имеете в виду, насколько я понял, я так понимаю, у меня сложилось впечатление* и т. п.).

Как показывает анализ научного диалога, ИРА широко востребованы в контекстах выражения несогласия с оппонентом, участвуя при этом в реализации двух типов моделей: в первом случае интерпретирующая интенция и интенция выражения несогласия выражаются дифференцированно, в рамках отдельных речевых действий; во втором – обе названные интенции реализуются синкретичным образом, в рамках одного высказывания.

1. Дифференцированная реализация интерпретации и несогласия.

Данный вариант обычно предполагает препозитивное расположение ИРА, предваряющего выражение несогласия, причем несогласие может выражаться как:

- альтернативное мнение (языковыми индикаторами в таком случае выступают конструкции *я считаю, мне кажется, по моему мнению, по мне, на мой взгляд* и т. п.):

– *Аузан говорит, что нет такой государственной функции, которую не могло бы выполнить общество. На мой взгляд, такая функция есть. Общество не может ни производить право, ни защищать право;*